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SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: 
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Anita Sinha* 
During the McCarthy era, Congress passed an obscure law authorizing 
detained immigrants to work for a payment of one dollar a day. The government 
justified the provision, which was modeled after the 1949 Geneva Convention’s 
protections for prisoners of war, in the context of the period’s relative heightened 
detentions of noncitizens. Soon afterwards, the enactment of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 diminished the use of detention drastically, and the 
practice of detainee labor lay dormant for decades. 
Modern changes to immigration law and its systems have rendered 
immigration detention today the largest mass incarceration movement in U.S. 
history. The use, and in some cases abuse, of detainee labor is one of the 
symptoms of an epidemic involving the growing influence of the criminal justice 
system and prison industry on immigration enforcement. This Article uncovers 
the historic origins of paid detainee labor, and then situates the practice within a 
contemporary immigration system that includes for-profit corporations and 
increasingly punitive characteristics. It examines the legal and policy distinctions 
between criminal incarceration and immigration detention. In doing so, it 
describes how detainee labor, particularly in cases when the work is forced, is a 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and involuntary 
servitude. The Article concludes by offering additional specific and systemic 
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recommendations, with the overarching objective of scaling back on the 
immigration detention system’s trend of operating more like a penal than civil 
institution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the spring of 2014, Hassall Moses was detained at the Northwest 
Detention Center, a 1575-bed immigration detention facility owned by The 
GEO Group, Inc. (GEO),1 a for-profit prison company. A sprawling campus-
like structure built in Tacoma, Washington “on a badly contaminated 
Superfund site,” 2  the Northwest Detention Center is one of the largest 
immigration detention facilities in the country. During Moses’s detention, the 
facility made headlines when about 700 of the detainees engaged in a hunger 
1. Northwest Detention Center, GEO GRP., INC., 
http://www.geogroup.com/maps/locationdetails/52 (last visited Aug. 16, 2014). GEO was 
established in 1983 as a division of the Wackenhut Corporation, and changed its name in 
2003 from the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation to The GEO Group, Inc. History, GEO
GRP., INC., http://geogroup.com/history (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
2. Max Blumenthal, Why Immigrant Detainees Are Turning to Civil Disobedience,
NATION (May 23, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/179987/why-immigrant-
detainees-are-turning-civil-disobedience#.  
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strike protesting the conditions of their confinement.3 The detainees’ demands 
included adequate medical care, an end to indefinite waits for their court 
hearings, and better-quality food.4 
The Northwest Detention Center personnel allegedly retaliated by placing a 
number of the hunger-striker detainees in solitary confinement, among other 
ways.5 One of these detainees was Moses, who claimed that he was put in 
solitary for “encouraging others to participate” in the strike, including by 
calling for a “no working strike.”6 The latter implicated the work conducted by 
detainees inside the facility—labor under the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) “Voluntary Work Program” (VWP) that, as Moses described, 
rendered detainees “the backbone of [the] detention center.”7 The demand 
associated with the work strike was an increase in pay because, in Moses’s 
words, it “is a modern-day slavery that we [detainees] are working for a dollar 
a day.”8   
The Northwest Detention Center strike is part of a broader context 
involving a bloated detention system within an immigration structure that is in 
crisis. Detaining immigrants is now the “largest mass incarceration movement 
in U.S. history.”9 Since 2009, Congress has ensured that more than 33,000 
noncitizens are detained on average each day,10 resulting in approximately 
400,000 immigrants in the detention system a year. Those who are detained are 
3. Dan Berger & Angélica Cházaro, Guest: What’s Behind the Hunger Strike at
Northwest Detention Center, SEATTLE TIMES, (Mar. 19, 2014, 5:08 PM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2023173231_danbergerangelicachazaroopedprisonhung
erstrike20xml.html. 
4. Berger & Cházaro, supra note 3; Blumenthal, supra note 2.
5. See Berger & Cházaro, supra note 3.
6. Interview with Hassall Moses (audio transcript on file with the author).
7. Id.
8. Id.; see also Berger & Cházaro, supra note 3.
9 . Melissa Harris Perry: Working in America for $1 a Day (MSNBC television
broadcast June 1, 2014), available at http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-
perry/watch/working-in-america-for-1-a-day-271647299870; see also DORA SCHRIRO,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (finding that “ICE 
operates the largest detention and supervised release program in the country”). In Fiscal Year 
2014, Congress allocated nearly $3 billion in funding for immigration detention programs. 
Complaint at 14, Det. Watch Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 14-
CV-00583 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2014).
10. This per-day detention average is the result of a Congressional mandate first passed
in 2008 subjecting DHS to what has been referred to as a “bed quota.” See infra Part I.B. 
Some question, however, whether this funding allocation constitutes a mandate. For 
example, the Freedom of Information Act lawsuit on the subject filed by Detention Watch 
Network seeks, inter alia, DHS’s reasoning for interpreting the mandate as a law 
enforcement quota and not a funding earmark. Complaint, supra note 9, at 11. On July 3, 
2014, the Southern District of New York ordered DHS to produce the requested documents 
on a monthly basis. Detention Watch Network (DWN) v. Immigration Customs & 
Enforcement (ICE), CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://www.ccrjustice.org/bed-quota-foia.  
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amongst the noncitizens the government has placed in removal proceedings, 
including lawful permanent residents, asylum seekers, and those with “status 
violations”—individuals who are undocumented because they entered without 
inspection or overstayed their visa.11 Many who are detained are subject to 
mandatory detention, 12  which means there is little to no discretionary 
determination of whether they should be locked up.13 Unlike prison sentences 
in the criminal context, immigration detention is inherently indeterminate, and 
due in part to the extensive backlogs in the immigration court system,14 the 
11. Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 13 (2009) (“The people in our immigration detention 
are not just the newly arrived or the ‘criminal offender.’ In fact, a large number of the 
detained are either long term permanent residents or those who are pursuing a claim for 
protection from persecution or torture.”); see PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION (May 22, 2006), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf (“Nearly half of all the unauthorized migrants 
now living in the United States entered the country legally through a port of entry such as an 
airport or a border crossing point where they were subject to inspection by immigration 
officials.”); The Ones They Leave Behind: Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents 
Harms U.S. Citizen Children, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/ones-they-leave-behind-deportation-lawful-
permanent-residents-harm-us-citizen-children. Ten percent of noncitizens deported by the 
government each year are Legal Permanent Residents. Keegan Hamilton, Asylum Insanity: 
Welcome to the Land of the Free, VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2014/04/asylum_insanity_welcome_to_the_land_
of_the_free.php?page=all. 
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2013) (requiring certain categories of immigrants to be
detained during removal proceedings). According to a report issued by ICE in 2009, sixty-
six percent of detainees are considered subject to mandatory detention. SCHRIRO, supra note 
9, at 6.  
13. Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration
and Imprisonment in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 438 (2011) (“Unlike 
many prisoners, non-U.S. citizens detained by ICE are practically denied the chance at 
judicial review of their detention.”). Individuals subject to mandatory detention may request 
a Joseph hearing, but this option is riddled with procedural defects. See infra Part I.B. 
Congress over the past several decades has vastly broadened what renders an immigrant 
subject to mandatory detention, predominantly by expanding the definition of what 
constitutes an “aggravated felony.” Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May 
Lead to Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/nyregion/31drug.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Steve 
Patrick Ercolani, Why Are Immigrants Being Deported for Minor Crimes?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
20, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/11/why-are-immigrants-being-
deported-for-minor-crimes/281622/.  
14. Ana Campoy, Clogged Immigration Courts Slow Hearings, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/clogged-immigration-courts-slow-hearings-
1407800048; Suzy Khimm, Many Immigrants Facing Deportation Must Wait 550 Days for 
Their Day in Court, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/22/many-immigrants-facing-
deportation-must-wait-550-days-for-their-day-in-court/; Dara Lind, How the Government 
Became the Single Biggest Employer of Unauthorized Immigrants, VOX (May 26, 2014), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/5/26/5752392/how-the-government-became-the-single-biggest-
employer-of-unauthorized.  
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average time some noncitizens remain in detention has gotten longer.15 
A key difference from criminal incarceration is that immigration detention 
was not conceived to be punitive, and despite its present scope and institutional 
design, 16  immigration detention remains a civil, regulatory scheme. The 
justification for detention is to ensure that noncitizens do not abscond prior to 
their hearings, or in cases when they have been ordered to be deported, prior to 
their removal from the United States.17 The fact that immigration detention is 
not punishment exempts the system from many rights afforded in the criminal 
context, including the right to counsel.18 It also raises the question of whether 
immigration detainee labor is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude, particularly in cases when 
detainees allege that the work is forced. 
Congress authorized the use of voluntary paid detainee labor over six 
decades ago, two years before federal immigration law was first codified in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).19 The law merits scrutiny in today’s 
context of mass incarceration of immigrants, where the voluntary nature of the 
work detainees perform is dubious, both in certain specific incidents of alleged 
forced labor and also, arguably, because of the for-profit motive behind today’s 
VWP. The number of individuals who have gone through the immigration 
detention system within a given year has more than doubled, from 204,459 in 
2001 to 478,000 in 2012.20 With this expansion, immigration detention has 
become a very lucrative business—almost half of the facilities are owned or 
operated by for-profit corporations, 21 with the Corrections Corporation of 
15. There are considerable differences in lengths of detainees’ incarceration based on
factors ranging from in which state they are detained, to whether they are contesting their 
removal. Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRACIMMIGRATION (June 3, 
2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321. 
16. See generally Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and
Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013) (describing how the legal 
institutions and administrative rules governing immigration detention, including an 
overreliance on mandatory detention and burden-shifting schemes, frustrate the purpose of 
detention as a tool for immigration enforcement). 
17. But see BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS 104-15 (2006) (detailing how
detention is largely unnecessary to achieve these goals, and that alternatives to detention 
such as ankle bracelet monitoring essentially accomplish the same results). 
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part III.A. This provision was codified separately under Title 8 of the
U.S. Code after the creation of the INA as 8 U.S.C. §1555(d). 
20. Complaint, supra note 9, at 9.
21. Chris Kirkham, Private Prisons Profit from Immigration Crackdown, Federal and
Local Law Enforcement Partnerships, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/private-prisons-immigration-federal-law-
enforcement_n_1569219.html. I will predominantly use “for-profit” instead of “private” to 
designate corporate involvement in immigration detention facilities because, as was pointed 
out to me by an advocate working on these issues, “private” is often mistaken for better 
conditions, e.g. a private school. “For-profit,” on the other hand, is more explicit as far as the 
structural and operational motivations for an entity’s control over a detention facility. 
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America (CCA)22 and GEO as the two largest companies in the immigration 
detention business.23 Detainee labor plays a significant role in how these 
corporations maximize their profits:  
[In 2013], at least 60,000 immigrants worked in the federal government’s 
nationwide patchwork of detention centers—more than worked for any other 
single employer in the country . . . . The cheap labor, 13 cents an hour, saves 
the government and the private companies $40 million or more a year by 
allowing them to avoid paying outside contractors the $7.25 federal minimum 
wage.24 
This Article questions the legality of paid detainee labor as it operates 
today. The use, and in some cases abuse, of detainee labor is one of the myriad 
symptoms of an epidemic involving the growing influence of the criminal 
justice system and prison industry on immigration enforcement. The 
immigration detention system is a civil system, although as this Article will 
discuss, it has taken a significant punitive turn. As such, immigrants are 
increasingly treated like criminals, even as the two statuses remain distinct. 
Prison labor in the criminal justice system has been deemed constitutional, 
specifically on account of the Exception Clause contained in the Thirteenth 
Amendment.25 With the increasing overlap between the criminal justice and 
immigration systems, importing yet another element, this time custodial labor, 
from the criminal into the immigration context easily could go unnoticed. I 
argue that it should not. 
The Article’s title is a reference to Douglas Blackmon’s Pulitzer Prize-
winning book, Slavery by Another Name,26 to emphasize how detainee labor 
fits into structural forces—in particular, American capitalism and the legal 
system—that drive the way in which exploitable labor is and has been 
constructed in the United States. In doing so, however, I recognize the 
significant difference in severity between the brutal discrimination, 
criminalization, and state-sponsored harm inflicted upon African Americans 
post-Emancipation, and the subject matter of detainee labor which is the focus 
22. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 10 (“CCA earned $752 million in federal contracts
in 2012.”). 
23. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Private Prison Companies Continue
Thriving Off Immigration Imprisonment, CRIMMIGRATION (Sept. 18, 2014 4:00 AM), 
http://crimmigration.com/2014/09/18/private-prison-companies-continue-thriving-off-
immigration-imprisonment-2; see also William Selway and Margaret Newkirk, Congress 
Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000 Immigrants as Private Prisons Profit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 
2013 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-24/congress-fuels-private-jails-
detaining-34-000-immigrants.html. 
24. Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor: Detainees Resist a
U.S. Program that Puts Them to Work for $1 a Day or Less, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/using-jailed-migrants-as-a-pool-of-cheap-
labor.html?_r=1. 
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).  
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of this Article. Drawing the comparisons between the systematic treatment of 
African Americans and immigrant detainees, however, reveals critical themes 
surrounding fairness and justice today, including the tolerance of legal 
discrimination against certain communities of color, and what Michelle 
Alexander names as the racial dimension of mass incarceration and the 
reconfiguration of a racial caste in this country.27 This Article will touch upon 
these themes implicitly and at times expressly, although exploring thoroughly 
the important intersectionalities between immigrants, poverty, people of color, 
prisoners, and low-wage work is beyond its scope. 
Part I provides a historical, legal, and policy overview of the immigration 
detention system. It discusses the well-settled construction of immigration 
enforcement, including detention, as a civil system. Part I also examines how 
modern reforms to U.S. immigration law and infrastructure have created an 
almost unquestioning criminalization of noncitizens, including their mass 
incarceration, which has been a significant boon to for-profit companies. Part II 
focuses on the practice of voluntary paid detainee labor. It details its legislative 
history, outlines modern analyses and the operation of the Voluntary Work 
Program, and discusses the range of reported problems associated with the 
practice. 
Part III presents how detainee labor, especially in cases when it is allegedly 
forced, is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection against slavery 
and involuntary servitude. In doing so, this Part examines the difference 
between custodial labor in the criminal justice and immigration settings, 
specifically by discussing the exception clause of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the treatment of prison labor in the pretrial context. Finally, the Conclusion 
offers an array of additional recommendations aimed at improving the practice 
of paid detainee labor, with a focus on both specific and systemic changes. 
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION, PUNISHMENT, AND PROFIT 
The objectives and use of immigration detention in the United States have 
changed dramatically in the past three decades. The present-day scale and 
structure of the system is virtually unrecognizable when compared to the 
manner in which it operated from its inception until the 1990s. Modern 
legislative and policy reforms have rendered immigration detention today to 
appear and function more like the criminal justice system than one that is still 
civil in nature. This transformation puts into question the relationship between 
detention’s rationale and its function today. Modern reforms to the immigration 
system also have heralded an era of mass incarceration of noncitizens, with for-
profit corporations making a lucrative business out of detaining immigrants.  
27. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).  
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A. The Legal and Policy Construction of Immigration Detention as a Civil 
Scheme 
The first federal immigration law that applied generally to noncitizens was 
the Immigration Act of 1882. 28  The Act’s intent echoed those of state 
immigration laws that governed migration up until this point,29 namely to keep 
out those deemed to be undesirable, including prohibiting “the landing of 
paupers and criminals and provid[ing] for the deportation of criminals who 
escaped exclusion at the time of arrival.”30 
But the 1882 Immigration Act did not mention, let alone authorize, 
detention,31 and it was almost another decade before Congress created federal 
immigration detention power.32 
A legislative review body known as the Ford Committee, tasked to 
investigate the operation of the 1882 Act, first raised the issue of federal 
detention power.33 Amongst its findings was the practical problem of inspecting 
thousands of immigrants per day without the ability to detain at least a portion 
of the incoming flow.34 In response, Congress in 1891 passed the first statute 
authorizing immigration detention at the federal level—the same year it created 
the federal prison system.35  The intent of creating a federal immigration 
detention power was not “to restrict immigration, but to sift it, to separate the 
desirable from the undesirable immigrants.”36 In other words, the purpose of 
28. Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal
Government, and the Formation of American Immigration Policy, J. AM. HIST. 1092, 1093 
(2013). The first Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted in the same year. Under the 
Immigration Act of 1882, immigration regulation and enforcement was a matter of state law. 
The exception was a set of federal statutes passed in 1798 that restricted the rights of citizens 
and non-citizens to criticize the government, or to take acts that might organize opposition to 
the federal government. Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law 
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1881 (1993) (“[T]he federal government briefly 
entered the alien regulation business in 1798. The package of legislation known to history as 
the Alien and Sedition Acts included three statutes directed specifically at aliens: the 
Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Alien (or Alien Friends) Act.”). 
29. The federal law was modeled after the immigration laws of New York and
Massachusetts in particular. Hirota, supra note 28, at 1095. 
30. Hirota, supra note 28, at 1093. The enactment of a general federal immigration
law, however, did not signal exclusive federal control over migratory matters—the 
administration of immigration enforcement during the 1880s was carried out as a joint state-
federal schema. Id. at 1094. 
31. DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 11 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id.
35. See James Houston, Shifting the Paradigm: Classification and Programs in Prison,
20 CRIM. JUST. REV. 66, 68 (1995); Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public 
Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 1023 (2009). 
36. WILSHER, supra note 31, at 12 (quoting WILLIAM D. OWEN, REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, H.R. REP. NO. 51-3472, at II-III (1891)) 
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detention was to facilitate processing.37 During this era, if the government 
initiated deportation proceedings after admission, it was “not as an exercise of 
social control over individuals long resident in the United States, but as an 
extension of the power to admit (or refuse admission to) arriving aliens.”38 
Soon after Congress created the federal immigration detention system, the 
Supreme Court established, in two seminal opinions, that both deportation and 
detention are civil in nature. In 1893, the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States held that “deportation is not a punishment for crime.”39 A few years 
later, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court characterized detention’s 
function as linked to the government’s immigration enforcement power, and in 
doing so rejected the imposition of immigration detention as punishment.40 The 
Court in Wong Wing examined the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1892,41 which enhanced the ban against most Chinese citizens and 
descendants from entering the United States by imposing a sentence of hard 
labor for violating the prohibition.42 The Court upheld Congress’s power to 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Detention was also acknowledged as a mechanism that 
could be beneficial from the vantage of immigrants, namely by providing “a period for 
migrants to send for financial or other help from relatives or community groups.” Id. at 13. 
37. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 39 QUEENS L.J.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 51) (on file with author) (“Originally, the United States 
put the onus to detain and deport rejected noncitizens on the shipping companies that 
transported them, resulting in a brief detention that closely related to deportation. The 
shipping companies and immigration officials had little incentive to prolong the process.”). 
38. Teresa A. Miller, Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost: Immigration Enforcement’s
Failed Experiment with Penal Severity, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 220 (2010). Between 
1892 and 1907, only a few hundred non-citizens were deported.  
Between 1908 and 1920, an average of two or three thousand non-citizens were removed 
each year, most of those people were removed from “asylums, hospitals and jails.” Those 
who entered unlawfully but managed to avoid early detection soon found safe harbor, since 
the law included a one-year statute of limitations on deportation.  
Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2007) (quoting MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 59 (2004)). This varies 
greatly from the practice today, where the government can deport any noncitizen, including 
long-term lawful permanent residents. See Ercolani, supra note 13. 
39. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
40. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235-37 (1896).
41. The Chinese Exclusion Act, first enacted in 1882, imposed a ten-year ban on the
migration of Chinese laborers into the United States, placed restrictions on Chinese workers 
already in the country, and denied Chinese migrants the ability to apply for citizenship. 
Ernesto Hernández-López, Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship: Examples from 
Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and when Questioning Birthright Citizenship, 14 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 267, 269 (2008). Congress renewed the Act in 1892 with the 
passage of the Geary Act, see James W. Gordon, “Was the First Justice Harlan Anti-
Chinese?”, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 287, 292-93 (2014), which included the provision at 
issue before the Supreme Court in Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235-37. 
42. Section 4 of the Act provided that “any such Chinese person or person of Chinese
descent, convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United 
States, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter 
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exclude and expel aliens and characterized detention “as part of the means 
necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of 
aliens.”43 But it held that the imposition of hard labor constitutes a criminal 
penalty that goes beyond the government’s immigration power,44 and thus held 
that the Act violated the Constitution’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.45 
Since this early era in American immigration law history, deportation, and 
by extension detention, has been consistently characterized as a civil, 
regulatory matter.46 In fact, as Stephen Legomsky has put it, “[i]f there has been 
any constant in U.S. immigration law, it is the insistence of the courts that 
deportation is not punishment.”47 That being said, immigration law is unique in 
its enforcement of a civil system through physical confinement.48 Its function is 
essentially preventive,49 namely to prevent noncitizens in removal proceedings 
removed from the United States.” Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 233-34 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
43. Id. at 235; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (characterizing
detention as “necessarily a part” of the deportation process). 
44. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1457, 1464. 
45. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of [C]ongress to protect, by summary 
methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable 
as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our land, and 
unlawfully remain therein. But to declare unlawful residence within the country to be an 
infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of 
the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt 
should first be established by a judicial trial.  
Id. at 237. 
46. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 511-12 (2007). 
47. Id. at 511 (stating further that “no court has ever deviated from this principle,” but
noting which held that deportation could be punishment in certain instances (citing Lieggi v. 
INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1975))); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the 
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration 
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 290 (2008) (“Before Fong Yue Ting, 
this civil designation [of removal proceedings], now taken for granted, was the subject of 
considerable debate. Since its initial pronouncement in these early cases, the Supreme Court 
has, despite frequent criticism, relied on the principle of stare decisis and repeatedly refused 
to revisit the issue of whether removal proceedings are civil or criminal in nature.”).  
48. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 3); see also Benson, supra note 11, at 17
(“Why is detention permissible in immigration law, as opposed to other important areas of 
civil law enforcement, whether it be tax collection or environmental protection? In a nation 
that abolished federal debtor’s prisons in 1835, why does the status of an individual’s 
citizenship allow a civil detention and restriction of individual liberty without individualized 
decision making?”). Some have compared immigration detention to civil commitment 
generally to argue that immigration detention should have higher substantive standards and 
procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on 
Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 377-79 (2014). 
49. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 17).
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or with a final order of removal from absconding.50 Noncitizens may be placed 
in immigration detention after the government charges them with an 
immigration violation through a document known as a Notice to Appear.51 But, 
it is important to note that if the alleged violation is based on criminal conduct, 
the noncitizen first goes through the criminal justice system, including, if 
appropriate, serving time in prison or jail.52  
The next Subpart details modern legal and policy changes that have led to a 
significantly heightened punitive immigration system. It is important to 
emphasize that despite these changes, the immigration system, including 
detention, remains distinct from the criminal justice system. This difference, 
established from virtually the beginning of federal immigration power, is why 
there are still “important reasons to consider [the rights of] those held purely 
under immigration powers separately from those convicted of criminal 
offenses.”53 In many important ways, the immigration system is built on this 
distinction. For example, noncitizens facing charges of an immigration 
violation, even the most vulnerable, such as children and those with mental 
disabilities, do not have a right to an attorney.54 The health care provided in 
50. See id. Studies have found, however, that the government can achieve the same
objective with comparable success and much less cost through alternatives to detention. See, 
e.g., OREN ROOT, VERA INST., THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
DETENTION FOR NONCITIZENS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 5 (2000) 
(finding, inter alia, that ninety-one percent of immigrants not detained attended all their 
immigration hearings). 
51. New Practice Advisory Regarding Notices to Appear, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL
(June 30, 2014), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/newsroom/release/new-
practice-advisory-regarding-notices-appear. There have been incidents where the 
government mistakenly has placed U.S. citizens in deportation proceedings and detention as 
well. See, e.g., William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine: A Citizen Trapped in the 
System, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 2013, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/the-deportation-machine; Ted Robbins, In 
the Rush to Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens, NPR (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141500145/in-the-rush-to-deport-expelling-u-s-citizens; 
Jacqueline Stevens, Deporting American Citizens: ICE’s Mexican-izing of Mark Lyttle, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacqueline-stevens-
phd/deporting-american-citize_b_265187.html. 
52. Bosworth & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 438 (“Those who have already served a
criminal sentence arguably experience an inverted double jeopardy—tried once but punished 
twice—when they are detained again prior to their removal rather than being deported 
immediately following the completion of their criminal sentence.”); see also Stumpf, supra 
note 37 (manuscript at 6) (“Immigration detention, however, relies upon a critical distinction 
to remain within the doctrinal borders of administrative law rather than criminal law. The 
central function of criminal law is to sort out who to punish and how. The central function of 
immigration law is to sort out who can enter and remain in the United States and for how 
long.”). 
53. Bosworth & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 438.
54. See Alyssa Campbell, Due Process, Not Deportation, for the Immigration System’s
Hidden Population: Did the American Bar Association’s Civil Immigration Standard Fall 
Short of Its Mission?, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581, 588 (2013) (focusing specifically on the 
lack of representation for detainees with mental disabilities). A mere sixteen percent of 
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immigration detention facilities is another stark example of the distinction.55 
Nonetheless, there is now a growing tension with a legal construct of 
immigration enforcement as civil in theory but increasingly punitive in 
practice.   
B. Immigration Detention’s Questionable Rationale Today 
As discussed above, the conception and function of immigration detention 
have been intrinsically tied to facilitating the deportation process. As such, the 
initial rationale of immigration detention was that it constituted a 
“constitutionally permissible liberty deprivation only to the extent necessary to 
enforce compliance with immigration proceedings.”56 As discussed below, in 
the modern historical context of the Cold War and post-9/11, immigration 
detention has also been rationalized vis-à-vis times of national security threats. 
The present-day mass incarceration of immigrants, however, does not appear to 
be tied to either rationale.   
Juliet Stumpf posits that the detention system exists today is decoupled 
from the long-standing justification as being intrinsically related to the 
government’s immigration enforcement powers, and instead operates as “the 
mirror image of criminal detention.” 57 The transformation of immigration 
detention is largely a product of the blurred lines between immigration and 
criminal law generally, a phenomenon that Stumpf has coined “crimmigration 
law.” 58  In the process, as former director of Immigration and Customs 
detainees have legal representation. Seth Freed Wessler, Dispatch from Detention: A Rare 
Look Inside Our ‘Humane’ Immigration Jails, COLORLINES (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/01/dispatch_from_detention_this_is_what_humane_dep
ortation_looks_like.html. Spurred by the rise in unaccompanied minors entering the United 
States, groups have filed a lawsuit to force the government to provide legal representations 
for children in removal proceedings. Mario Trujillo, Immigrant Groups File Suit to 
Represent Unaccompanied Children Crossing Border, HILL (July 9, 2014), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/211695-lawsuit-filed-over-legal-representation-
for-child-immigrants. 
55. In the context of medical care, it has been noted that “[t]here are fundamental
problems with holding individuals in long-term custody under conditions designed for the 
short term.” Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration 
Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 602 (2010). 
56. Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to
Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2012). 
57. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 4-5); see also Miller, supra note 38, at 235
(“Detention has been used as a means of managing non-U.S. citizens for over a hundred 
years, dating back to 1892 . . . . However, it is only within the past twenty years that 
immigration detention has expanded beyond a few distinct facilities, into an expansive 
network of custodial facilities varying dramatically in size, staffing, and supervision.”). 
58. Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration law” to describe the phenomenon of the
line between criminal and immigration law becoming increasingly indistinct. Juliet Stumpf, 
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367, 376 (2006); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L.
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Enforcement’s Office of Detention Policy and Planning Dora 
Schriro acknowledges, detention has strayed from its administrative purpose of 
facilitating the immigration process, and become a functionally punitive 
system.59 One consequence of this shift is that “[d]etention facilities play a key 
role in creating incentives for longer and more restrictive deprivations of 
liberty.”60 This Subpart will summarize the considerable scholarship on modern 
immigration legislative and policy reforms, focusing on the reforms that have 
brought about what arguably is a transformation to the fundamental character 
of immigration detention.61 
The trend of criminalizing immigration, while historically rooted, is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.62 The recent history began with the mass arrival 
of Haitians, Cubans, and Central Americans seeking refuge in the United States 
in the 1980s, which prompted en masse and prolonged detention practices63 that 
first existed, albeit briefly, during the height of the Cold War.64 The legislative 
changes that ensued created the bedrock for immigration enforcement and 
detention practices in place today.65 
The first pair of legislative changes during this period that specifically 
impacted the detention of noncitizens was in 1986, with the passage of the 
REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (describing the immigration detention system as “immcarceration”); 
Miller, supra note 38, at 223-24 (“The immigration system has not simply imitated the 
techniques of criminal punishment, it has become a hybrid system of ‘crimmigration’ as 
criminal and immigration law enforcement procedures have converged . . . .”). 
59. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 4.
60. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 52).
61. See generally Hernández, supra note 44 (arguing that since the 1980s, immigration
policy has “increasingly adopted the securitized approach of criminal law enforcement,” 
while criminal law has borrowed “the more lax procedures traditionally used in the civil 
immigration law system” when investigating crimes associated with immigration). 
62. See David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 164-65 (2012) (describing the criminalization of immigration 
enforcement as “[g]radual[] and then sudden[]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Congress blurred the boundary between criminal and immigration law as early as 1929, 
when “Congress made illegal entry into the United States a misdemeanor and illegal entry 
following deportation a felony.” Id. at 164. 
63. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 935-36 (1995); see 
also Evangeline G. Abriel, Ending the Welcome: Changes in the United States’ Treatment of 
Undocumented Aliens (1986 to 1996), 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1998); Mark D. 
Kemple, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Mariel Cubans 
Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1733, 1735-36 (1989) (describing how most of the 125,000 Mariel Cubans who fled to the 
U.S. during the spring of 1980 were denied admission and detained at Guantanamo Bay and 
in “camps in Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and the Atlanta Penitentiary in Georgia for 
varying lengths of time”); Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in the United States 
Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2394 (1994). 
64. See infra Part II.A.1.
65. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1360 (2014). 
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Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA).66 Known for igniting the “War on Drugs,”67 the ADAA significantly 
expanded which drug offenses could lead to a noncitizen’s deportation.68 The 
ADAA also amended the INA to introduce the practice of detainers,69 which 
request that law enforcement officials hold an individual in criminal custody 
for federal immigration officials. 70 IRCA, best known for its legalization 
program71 and its regulation72 and criminalization73 of unauthorized work, also 
66. The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments were also passed in 1986, which
rendered marrying for the purpose of immigration benefits a felony. Sklansky, supra note 62, 
at 165.  
67. Hernández contends that the U.S. government tapped into the country’s concerns
about drugs to expand immigration detention powers, stating, “Congress in effect envisioned 
immigration detention as a central tool in the nation’s burgeoning war on drugs.” Hernández, 
supra note 65, at 1349; see also Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy Stupid: The Hijacking 
of the Debate over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on 
Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583 (2010) (arguing that 
immigration actually does not have anything to do with constructed phenomena such as the 
war on drugs). 
68. Hernández, supra note 65, at 1363 (noting that the ADAA replaced “a reference to
convictions involving an ‘addiction-sustaining opiate’ with much broader language 
encompassing any conviction involving a state, federal, or foreign country’s controlled 
substance”). 
69. Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United
States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 690 (2013). 
70. See generally Alia Al-Khatib, Comment, Putting A Hold on ICE: Why Law
Enforcement Should Refuse to Honor Immigration Detainers, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 109 (2014).
There has been considerable discussion as to whether the detainer provision requires or 
merely requests that noncitizens be held for the purposes of transfer to ICE custody. See 
KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL 
ISSUES 12-15 (2014); Lasch, supra note 69, at 629, 695 (arguing that a detainer is only a 
request and “does not bind the receiving agency in any way”); Third Circuit Appeals Court 
Rules that Immigration Detainers Are Non-Binding Requests in Ground-Breaking Case, 
ACLU (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/third-circuit-appeals-court-
rules-immigration-detainers-are-non-binding-requests; Gosia Wozniacka, Oregon Ruling 
Spurs Halt on Immigration Detainers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17, 2014) 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oregon-ruling-spurs-halt-immigration-detainers.  
71. “IRCA had an immediate and dramatic effect on the lives of millions of
unauthorized immigrants who legalized their status,” and ultimately around 2.7 million 
individuals were able to legalize their status. Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner & Claire 
Bergeron, At Its 25th Anniversary, IRCA’s Legacy Lives on, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Nov. 
16, 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-25th-anniversary-ircas-legacy-lives.  
72. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 987 (“Prior to 
IRCA, the relationship between employer and undocumented employee was not a direct 
object of immigration regulation.”).  
73. See Sklansky, supra note 62, at 165 (describing how the IRCA criminalized
working without authorization, including the use of false documents). See generally DAVID
BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES
IMMIGRANTS (2008) (documenting the effect of increased work criminalization on immigrant 
communities). The criminalization of workers also directly caused increased enforcement, 
including detention of noncitizens, especially during the George W. Bush Administration, 
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“blurred the boundary between civil detention and penal detention by 
encouraging the confinement of excludable and deportable individuals in 
prisons operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.”74 Additionally, IRCA 
encouraged the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to use 
detention as part of its investigative process, especially for noncitizens 
convicted of a felony.75 Lastly, amendments in 1988 to the ADAA further 
impacted the function of immigration detention by creating the category of 
“aggravated felonies.”76 Initially a classification that covered only murder, drug 
trafficking, and weapon trafficking,77 Congress in subsequent years drastically 
expanded what qualifies as an aggravated felony so that it has become, as 
Nancy Morawetz puts it, an “Alice-in-Wonderland-like definition . . . [where 
the] crime need not be either aggravated or a felony.”78 
The other major set of legislative reforms that propelled the present-day 
mass incarceration of immigrants was in 1996,79 with the enactment of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). These laws 
came on the heels of the Oklahoma City bombing, and so “images of migrant 
criminality became an important justification for the [1996] legislation,”80 even 
which emphasized workplace raids. See David Bacon & Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of 
Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 79-80 (2010); Bosniak, supra note 72, at 
988 (“In recent years . . . the single most significant site of INS law enforcement, after the 
immediate border area itself, has been the workplace.”). Bacon and Hing also point out that 
the notion of employer sanctions was not created by the 1986 law, but instead dates back to 
1952. Bacon & Hing, supra at 85. 
74. Hernández, supra note 65, at 1364.
75. Id. at 1363.
76. Id. at 1366.
77. Gerald Seipp, The Aggravated Felony Concept in Immigration Law: Traps for the
Unwary and Opportunities for the Knowledgeable, 02-01 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (Jan. 
2002). 
78. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000) (“For example, a 
conviction for simple battery or for shoplifting with a one-year suspended sentence—either 
of which would be a misdemeanor or a violation in most states—can be deemed an 
aggravated felony.”). 
79. There were laws enacted throughout the 1990s and before 1996 that steadily
widened the breadth of criminalizing immigrants, including: the Immigration Act of 1990; 
the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991; the 
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994; and the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. For example, the Immigration Act of 1990 
expanded what constitutes aggravated felonies to include “crimes of violence” for which 
there were at least a five-year sentence of imprisonment and in 1994, Congress added 
additional crimes, including certain fraud and money laundering offenses. Seipp, supra note 
77, at 1-2. 
80. Chacón, supra note 38, at 1843; see also MICHAEL WELCH, Panic, Risk, Control:
Conceptualizing Threats in a Post-9/11 Society, in PUNISHING IMMIGRANTS: POLICY,
POLITICS, AND INJUSTICE 17, 18-19 (Charis E. Kubrin et al. eds., 2012). 
16 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [XI:1 
though the perpetrator was American-born Timothy McVeigh.81  
AEDPA also “requires mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted on a 
broad array of offenses, including minor drug offenses,” and IIRIRA further 
expanded the list of offenses triggering detention. 82 For example, asylum 
seekers, regardless of their criminal history, became subject to mandatory 
detention.83 By imposing mandatory detention on a wide swath of noncitizens, 
AEDPA and IIRIRA marked an about-face from the status quo of parole 
alternatives to detention that was in place since the INA was enacted in 1952.84  
The other significant provision of IIRIRA that impacted the scope of 
detention was the creation of INA section 287(g), which allowed for the 
deputization of local law enforcement officers to enforce immigration laws.85 
AEDPA was an anti-immigration law veiled as an antiterrorism measure—a 
tactic that became virtually ubiquitous in the post-9/11 era—and IIRIRA, 
marketed as attacking “illegal immigration,” in fact significantly impacted 
lawful permanent residents by “convert[ing] many . . . into criminal aliens.”86 
The 1996 legislation capped a decade of overhauling an immigration system 
that now “codif[ied] a zero tolerance enforcement strategy against 
81. Ella Dlin, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: An Attempt
to Quench Anti-Immigration Sentiments?, 38 CATH. LAW. 49, 50-51 (1998); Kevin R. 
Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary 
Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 300 (2000). 
82. ROBERT KOULISH, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: SUBVERTING THE
RULE OF LAW 49 (2010); see also Morawetz, supra note 78 at 1936, 1946. 
83. See Whitney Chelgren, Note, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is
Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1477, 1484 (2011); Kristen M. Jarvis Johnson, Fearing the United States: Rethinking 
Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 589, 590 (2007). 
84. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA 11-12 (2012). Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention may request 
a Joseph hearing, which is a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether the 
classification is proper. These hearings are tainted, however, by procedural problems. See 
Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less 
Process than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1833, 1849 (2011). 
85. Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 121 (2012). Intended as a public safety program 
targeting “criminal aliens and terrorists,” about half of the arrests made under the program 
have led to the detention of noncitizens with misdemeanors, including traffic violations. 
RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: 287(G)
STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/delegation-and-divergence-287g-state-and-local-
immigration-enforcement. In some jurisdictions, misdemeanor arrests account for as high as 
eighty percent of the arrests. Id. 
86. Chacón, supra note 38, at 1846. It is important to note that these legislative
changes were applied retroactively, which meant that long-time legal permanent residents 
with old convictions suddenly found themselves in the immigration system. See, e.g., 
Bernstein, supra note 13. 
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immigrants.”87 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, solidified the rhetorical and 
operational association between immigration and criminal law, although the 
legislative changes merging the two systems had already largely occurred.88 
One of the most significant impacts of 9/11 on the immigration system is what 
Allegra McLeod calls “institutional repurposing”: the reorganization of 
institutions involved in immigration enforcement with the purported goal of 
focusing on “criminal aliens.”89 
The most drastic reorganization was the dismantling of the INS and 
creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.90 The 
other significant shift was increased collaboration with the criminal justice 
system, from its technology to personnel, for immigration enforcement.91 One 
example was the piloting in 2008 of the Secure Communities program, which 
expanded the 287(g) program by allowing local law enforcement to share 
arrestees’ fingerprints with immigration officials.92 Post-9/11 also drew the for-
profit prison industry squarely into the immigration detention business: “Many 
[prison] companies struggled in the late 1990s amid a glut of private prison 
construction, with more facilities built than could be filled, but a spike in 
immigrant detention after Sept. 11 helped revitalize the industry.”93  
87. KOULISH, supra note 82, at 41; see also Hernández, supra note 65, at 1369 (“By the
mid-1990s prisons had become a fact of life and a go-to tactic for legislators engaged in drug 
war legislating, and immigrants were not exempted.”). 
88. McLeod, supra note 85, at 121 (“It is worth noting that the significant changes in
U.S. criminal-immigration law occurred during the 1990s, well before September 11, 2001. 
In the aftermath of that day, however, criminal-immigration enforcement became an 
increasingly central component of the U.S. immigration regulatory regime, even though the 
pivotal moment of expansion of criminal-immigration enforcement powers happened several 
years earlier.”).  
89. Id. at 121-22.
90. DHS was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). It is 
made up of twenty-two sub-agencies, including a handful encompassing the constellation of 
immigration agencies such as the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
Who Joined DHS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
91. The post-9/11 collaboration between the criminal justice and immigration system
was a two-way street, insofar as the immigration system was used to charge and hold 
suspected terrorists against whom the government did not have enough evidence to charge 
and hold criminally. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and 
Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 6 (2006).  
92. MICHELLE MITTELSTADT ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., THROUGH THE PRISM OF
NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE DECADE 
SINCE 9/11 11 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS23_Post-9-
11policy.pdf; see also Lasch, supra note 69, at 677. 
93. Urbina, supra note 24. Although there has been growth in immigration detention
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One year after DHS was in operation, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act required DHS to add 8000 detention beds, contingent 
upon funding from Congress. 94  Congress provided the funds, committing 
support in 2005 for 18,500 beds in the detention system.95 But this was only the 
beginning of the immigration detention boom. The number of beds increased 
by eighty-four percent after 2005. 96 By 2009, the number of immigrants 
detained by the government was at 33,400 per day, a number reflecting a new 
Congressional quota, or “bed mandate,” added to DHS’s annual spending 
budget.97 This “bed mandate” requires ICE to detain a minimum number of 
individuals on average per day,98 and today the mandate stands at 34,000.99 The 
quota is emblematic of today’s runaway immigration detention system—as 
Stumpf has put it, “[t]he ‘bed mandate’ is the most visible manifestation of 
detention driving deportation.”100 
The drastic changes to the immigration system have indicated a broader 
shift in immigration policy from pursuing a largely administrative function to 
having a retributive agenda, the latter of which “is rooted in mythologies of 
after 9/11 in response to the legislative changes highlighted above, this growth started before 
9/11. In 1985, the daily number of detained immigrants was about 2200; in 1995, this 
number tripled to 6600 per day. WILSHER, supra note 31, at 70. 
94. William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000





97. JENNIFER E. LAKE & BLAS NUÑEZ-NETO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34482,
HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT: FY2009 APPROPRIATIONS 35, 36, 40 (2009). 
98. Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH.
POST (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-
immigration-detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-
1a919f2ed890_story.html. 
99. This past year Congress voted on the mandate (as opposed to passing it via
appropriations), and DHS testified that the quota is at least 2000 more than necessary. Andy 
Sullivan, Insight: Congress Keeps Detention Quota Despite Immigration Debate, REUTERS 
(July 8, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-usa-immigration-
detention-insight-idUSBRE96711920130708. The mandate nonetheless passed. Miroff, 
supra note 98. For a breakdown on how much it costs to keep this number of immigrants 
detained see NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 
(2013), available at http://immigrationforum.org/blog/the-math-of-immigration-detention-2. 
100. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 60). Immigration detention has not only 
changed in scope, but also in duration. In 1981, the average detention length was four days. 
By 1994, that number increased to 26.5 days; from 2001 to today, the average duration of 
detention is about 29.5 days. There is a significant variation on this average, depending on a 
noncitizen’s immigration status and nationality. The number of detainees “held for more 
than 180 days following an order of removal increased from 1,847 in 1994 to 5,266 in 
2001.” WILSHER, supra note 31, at 70. Mexicans were “swiftly removed . . . . [n]on-
Mexicans . . . were detained for sixty-three days. For one-quarter of the countries to which 
aliens were removed detention periods averaged over 120 days.” Id. 
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migrant criminality . . . .”101 This trend is part of the broader pattern of 
criminalizing communities of color in the United States.102 The United States 
currently “has the highest rate of [criminal] incarceration in the world, dwarfing 
the rates of nearly every developed country . . . . No other country in the world 
imprisons so many of its racial or ethnic minorities.”103 It therefore, perhaps, 
should not come as a surprise that the detention of noncitizens is now the new 
wave of mass incarceration in our country. 
C. Mass Incarceration of Noncitizens and the For-Profit Prison Industry 
While detaining individuals the government sought to deport was atypical 
in the not-so-distant past, today it has become virtually “commonplace.”104 In 
Schriro’s 2009 report, ICE acknowledges the nexus between recent policy 
changes, such as those mentioned in the previous Subpart, and the population 
explosion in immigration detention facilities.105 One of the ramifications of the 
spike in demand for detention facilities over a relatively short period of time is 
that the immigration detention system has heavily borrowed, if not mimicked 
completely, the prison system. 106  With a record-breaking number of 
101. Chacón, supra note 38, at 1890-91; see also Hernández, supra note 44, at 1458 
(“[T]he procedural and substantive law that comprises crimmigration law has reimagined 
noncitizens as criminal deviants and security risks.”). Although outside the scope of this 
Article, it is important to note that the legislative changes described in this Subpart also 
caused a spike in immigration-related criminal prosecutions, which is distinct from detention 
and removal based on immigration violations. Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 
YALE L.J. 2282, 2286-87 (2013) (“Today, immigration crime is the largest single category of 
crime prosecuted by the federal government and noncitizens are over one-fourth of federal 
prisoners.”); Legomsky, supra note 46, at 476; McLeod, supra note 85, at 107 (“Between 
1990 and 2010, immigration offenses became the most common federally prosecuted crimes 
in the United States.” (footnote omitted)); Sklansky, supra note 62, at 166 (“Over a twelve-
year period, from 1997 to 2009, immigration prosecutions per year grew more than tenfold, 
from less than 9,000 to 90,000.”). 
102. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 27; Angela Davis, Race and 
Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
GENDER: SELECTED READINGS 204 (Joseph F. Healey & Eileen O’Brien eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
103. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 6; see also Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: 
Why Do We Lock up So Many People?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america (“Mass 
incarceration on a scale almost unexampled in human history is a fundamental fact of our 
country today—perhaps the fundamental fact, as slavery was the fundamental fact of 1850. 
In truth, there are more black men in the grip of the criminal-justice system . . . than were in 
slavery then. Over all, there are now more people under ‘correctional supervision’ in 
America—more than six million—than were in the Gulag Archipelago under Stalin at its 
height.”).  
104. Sklansky, supra note 62, at 182. 
105. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 11-12. 
106. But see Stumpf, supra note 58, at 402 (“[T]he rapid importation of criminal 
grounds into immigration law is consistent with a shift in criminal penology from 
rehabilitation to harsher motivations: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and the 
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deportations, “a vast network of immigration detention facilities has emerged—
a kind of parallel prison system, operating alongside and in conjunction with 
the network of facilities for criminal detention and punishment.”107 In fact, 
immigration detention facilities often use the same physical spaces and 
personnel as prisons and jails.108  
The immigration detention system today “is a sprawling and varied 
system”109 comprised of approximately 250 facilities.110 Some are processing 
centers where, as the name suggests, individuals charged with removable 
immigration offenses are detained pending processing, and often are moved to 
another facility. The second type of detention structures is dedicated facilities, 
where all of the beds in the facility are used to hold immigration detainees. The 
last type is shared-use jails, where individuals held on criminal and 
immigration charges are incarcerated in the same facility.111 
Despite the fact that DHS oversees the largest detention system in the 
country,112 its operations are not bound by regulation.113 Instead, immigration 
detention facilities are governed by “standards,” which are adopted from the 
criminal justice system: “The national detention standards that the [former] 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) introduced in 2000 . . . . which 
were then updated by ICE in 2008, are based upon the American Correctional 
Association (ACA) jail detention standards for pretrial felons.”114 In 2010, in 
response to a slew of detainee deaths and reports of misconduct within the 
facilities, “DHS replaced the National Detention Standards with the 
Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS),” but substantively 
“the two are strikingly similar.”115 Despite advocacy efforts to make them fully 
enforceable,116 they “remain mere guidelines.”117  
expressive power of the state.”). 
107. Sklansky, supra note 62, at 182. 
108. See Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 46) (“When the immigration detention 
system uses the same facilities, procedures, and personnel as the criminal detention system, 
the detention experience becomes indistinguishable from that of criminal punishment.”). 
109. Sklansky, supra note 62, at 183. 
110. Urbina, supra note 24. 
111. Miller, supra note 38, at 235-36. 
112. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 2. 
113. See, e.g., Maunica Sthanki, Reconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the 
Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 450 (2013) (noting that the ICE 
“standards are unenforceable”); Noah Nehemiah Gillespie, Note, Positive Law: Providing 
Adequate Medical Care for HIV-Positive Immigration Detainees, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1329, 1339 (2013) (stating that ICE standards are “policies” that “are not legally binding”). 
114. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 16. 
115. Chelgren, supra note 83, at 1487-88.  
116. ACLU, HOLIDAY ON ICE: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S NEW
IMMIGRATION DETENTION STANDARDS 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_detention_standards_hearing_statement_final_2.pdf 
(stating that the PBNDS “are only the first step” in improving detention facilities, and while 
significant and necessary, more action is needed).  
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Immigration detention facilities, therefore, operate like jails and prisons,118 
only worse. Unlike their criminal counterparts, there is no “automatic judicial 
oversight of immigration detention centers . . . .”119 While the programs and 
services in detention are required and regulated by statute and case law, 
effective compliance is difficult to achieve.120 Moreover, detainees are often 
held outside the jurisdiction in which they were arrested, far away from their 
families and resources. 121  Given this context, many practices within 
immigration detention facilities, including “voluntary” paid detainee labor, are 
troublesome. 
1. The Role of For-Profit Corporations and the Historical Use of Custodial
Labor 
Each of the three types of immigration detention facilities mentioned above 
are “owned or operated, to varying degrees, by private companies.”122 For-
profit corporations began to get into the prison business in the early 1980s, 
“when the criminal justice policies in the United States underwent a period of 
intense politicization and harsh transformation,” including “[d]raconian 
sentencing laws and get-tough correctional policies.”123 During this era, the 
117.   Conditions in Immigration Detention, DET. WATCH NETWORK, 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2383 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).  
118. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 4.  
119. Bosworth & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 437. 
120.    SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 23, 25; see also ACLU, PRISONERS OF PROFIT:
IMMIGRANTS AND DETENTION IN GEORGIA 14-17 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/42/244/ (outlining problems in several 
Georgia immigration detention facilities, including access to phone services, religious 
services, and recreational time); DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE, ONE YEAR 
LATER: THE ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2013), available at 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ExposeAndClose (describing complaints about lack 
of access to healthcare, restrictions on fresh air, sanitation, and solitary confinement, in 
select detention facilities across the country). 
121. See Kirk Semple & Tim Eaton, Detention for Immigrants That Looks Less Like 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/us/model-
immigration-detention-center-unveiled-in-texas.html?_r=0 (“Critics . . . . accused 
immigration officials of impinging on detainees’ civil rights by frequently transferring them 
from jail to jail, often far away from their families and lawyers.”). 
122. Chelgren, supra note 83, at 1486. 
123. Judith Greene, Banking on the Prison Boom, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES
MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 3, 3-4 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007); see 
also Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case Against 
State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 232–33 (2009); Ari 
Melber, Presumed Guilty: How Prisons Profit off the ‘War on Drugs’ (MSNBC television 
broadcast Aug. 14, 2013), available at http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/presumed-guilty-how-
prisons-profit-the; Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a 
New Form of Slavery?, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Mar. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-big-business-or-a-
new-form-of-slavery/8289. 
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Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and Geo Group Inc. (GEO) grew to 
be the two largest prison corporations in the United States,124 and at U.S. 
taxpayers’ expense. 125  Private corporations not only made profits running 
facilities, they also have scored lucrative contracts for services related to 
incarceration, 126  including providing meals, 127  telephone services, 128  money 
transfers,129 prisoner transportation,130 and even medical care.131  
The parallel legislative and policy changes during the 1980s and 1990s 
related to the increased criminalization of immigration discussed in Part I.B 
also opened the door for companies to enter the detention business.132 The post-
9/11 era saw the “outsourcing [of] immigration control,” 133  including 
immigration detention facilities, helping CCA’s revenue to grow more than 
124. See supra note 23.
125. See Ray Downs, Who’s Getting Rich off the Prison-Industrial Complex?, VICE
(May 2013), http://www.vice.com/read/whos-getting-rich-off-the-prison-industrial-complex. 
Both the CCA and the GEO have restructured internally so that they can be classified as Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which are exempt from paying federal taxes. Nathaniel 
Popper, Restyled as Real Estate Trusts, Varied Businesses Avoid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/business/restyled-as-real-estate-trusts-
varied-businesses-avoid-taxes.html?_r=0. 
126. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005). Hedge funds and banks invest heavily in prison corporations and thus are also 
significant profiteers of the industry. Vanguard and Fidelity Investments are two more 
investment management companies that own large stakes in CCA and GEO Group. Downs, 
supra note 125. 
127. See Paul Egan, Michigan Prison Food Vendor Fined $98,000 for Worker
Fraternization, Menu Problems, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 11, 2014, 8:15 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/article/20140311/NEWS06/303110103/michigan-department-of-
corrections-fines-prison-food-vendor. 
128. Steven J. Jackson, Mapping the Prison Telephone Industry, in PRISON PROFITEERS:
WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 235, 235 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright 
eds., 2007). 
129. Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prisons, Sky-High Phone Rates
and Money Transfer Fees, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/business/in-prisons-sky-high-phone-rates-and-money-
transfer-fees.html?_r=0.    
130. Alex Friedmann, For-Profit Transportation Companies: Taking Prisoners and the
Public for a Ride, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 
265, 265 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007). 
131. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 510–
11 (2005). 
132. For-profit prison companies also contracted with governments to operate half-way
houses, juvenile facilities, and work-release programs. Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, 
Note, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J.
CORP. L. 577, 582-83 (2008); see also Stumpf, supra note 58, at 403 (“From the 1950s 
through the 1970s, both criminal and immigration sanctions reflected a rehabilitation 
model . . . [which] fell into disfavor after the 1970s.”). 
133. Robert Koulish, Privatization of Immigration Control, in IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: SUBVERTING THE RULE OF LAW 75 (2010). 
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sixty percent over the past decade.134 Today, CCA and GEO combined “hold[] 
almost two-thirds of all immigrants detained each day.”135 
In the Introduction, we heard Hassall Moses describe detainee labor as 
“modern-day slavery” that constitutes the “backbone” of the Northwest 
Detention Center facility in which he was detained. Another detainee, Pedro 
Guzman, who was held in the Stewart Detention Center in Georgia, reported 
that ninety percent of the jobs in the CCA-operated facility is done by 
detainees.136 During his almost twenty-month detention, Guzman “cleaned the 
communal areas, cooked, painted walls, ran paperwork and buffed floors.”137 
Guzman earned a dollar a day for his work, except when he worked in the 
kitchen, where he earned three dollars a day.138 Professor Jacqueline Stevens, 
who has investigated the issue of detainee labor extensively, states: “[T]he ICE 
jails are paying people $1/day for work that minimum wage laws would require 
compensated at $29-$58/day.”139 As a result, detainee labor adds up to save the 
entities that run immigration detention facilities “$40 million or more a 
year.”140  
Immigrant detainee labor is a continuation of the American practice of 
exploiting labor through incarceration. Exploited custodial labor first emerged 
on the backs of African Americans in the infamous forms of convict leasing 
and chain gangs following the abolition of slavery—or in Douglas Blackmon’s 
words, convict forced labor became “slavery by another name.”141 Convict 
leasing “functioned with the Black Codes to reestablish and maintain the race 
relationships of slavery by returning the control over the lives of these African 
Americans to white plantation owners.”142  Southern states phased out the 
convict lease system by the turn of the nineteenth century, but at that same time 
“prisoners were increasingly being made to work in the most brutal form of 
convict forced labor in the United States, the chain gang.”143 Today, cheap 
134. Urbina, supra note 24. 
135. Selway & Newkirk, supra note 94 (“[CCA] and Geo have each about doubled in 
value since mid-2010.”). 
136. Yana Kunichoff, “Voluntary” Work Program Run in Private Detention Centers 






140. Urbina, supra note 24. 
141. BLACKMON, supra note 26. 
142. Julie Browne, The Labor of Doing Time, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: CONFRONTING 
THE PRISON CRISIS 61, 63 (Elihu Rosenblatt ed., 1996); see also ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE
THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH 
19 (1996) (stating that “[c]onvict labor depended upon both the heritage of slavery and the 
allure of industrial capitalism”). 
143. Browne, supra note 142, at 64 (noting that chain gangs were specifically created 
to labor for the expansion of public roads and highways at the time). 
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labor in the criminal context is a widespread practice both inside and outside 
penitentiary walls. While largely less physically brutal than its historical 
counterpart, the practice continues to be an economic boon for both the public 
and private sector.144  
The remainder of this Article focuses on the analog to prison labor in the 
immigration detention setting—detainee labor. In doing so, it will emphasize 
the legal, policy, and institutional differences between the criminal and 
immigration detention systems in which these forms of custodial labor operate. 
However, while a thorough examination of the subject is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is important to at least note here that the trajectories of racism, 
criminalization, as well as structural forces such as law and capitalism, in many 
ways link prison labor specifically to the general systemic problems of 
immigrant work. Made in the context of opposition to federal immigration 
reform, Representative Dana Rohrabacher captured some of the complex 
connections between the two forms of exploited work when he declared, “Let 
the prisoners pick the fruits. We can do it without bringing in millions of 
foreigners.”145 
144.   Beneficiaries of prison labor today include universities and the federal 
government. Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAL. U. L. REV. 857, 868 (2008) 
(“[O]ffice furniture, especially in state universities and the federal government, is a major 
prison labor product. Inmates also take hotel reservations at corporate call centers, make 
body armor for the U.S. military, and manufacture prison chic fashion accessories, in 
addition to the iconic task of stamping license plates.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, mega-
corporations such as Starbucks, Boeing, BP, Victoria’s Secret, McDonalds, and Walmart all 
profit from prison labor. Nicole Goodkind, Top 5 Secrets of the Private Prison Industry, 
YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 6, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/top-5-secrets-
private-prison-industry-163005314.html; Sadhbh Walshe, How US Prison Labour Pads 
Corporate Profits at Taxpayers’ Expense, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012) 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/06/prison-labor-pads-corporate-profits-
taxpayers-expense; Abe Louise Young, BP Hires Prison Labor to Clean up Spill While 
Coastal Residents Struggle, NATION (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/37828/bp-hires-prison-labor-clean-spill-while-coastal-
residents-struggle. 
145.   Zatz, supra note 144, at 859 (citing Carl Hulse & Rachel L. Swarns, 
Conservatives Stand Firm on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A12). Alabama 
lost a significant portion of its agricultural workforce after it passed an anti-immigration law 
in 2011, and the head of the state’s agricultural department suggested replacing these 
workers with prison laborers. See, e.g., Amanda Peterson Beadle, Alabama Official Suggests 
Using Prisoners As Farm Workers After Immigration Law Scares Away Laborers, 
THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 7, 2011, 3:40 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/10/07/338922/alabama-prisoners-immigrants-farm-
labor/. 
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II. VOLUNTARY PAID DETAINEE LABOR
A. Legislative History
In 1950, two years before the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), the comprehensive body of federal law governing 
immigration,146 Congress passed what stands today as the legal authority for 
voluntary paid labor in immigration detention facilities.147 The objective of the 
1950 law generally was to authorize the Department of Justice (DOJ) to surpass 
the appropriations process148 to incur what was characterized as recurring 
“administrative expenses.” 149  Providing for paid detainee labor was a 
subsection of a bill that covered many areas,150 but it received considerable 
attention during congressional deliberations. 
Section 6 of the DOJ expenditure bill contained the provision providing for 
the payment of noncitizens held in detention for work performed. Section 6 
generally addressed a range of expenditures relating specifically to the INS, 
including paying interpreters and translators who are not citizens and 
distributing citizenship textbooks to detainees without cost.151 The provision 
authorizing paid detainee labor, Section 6(d), read as follows: “Appropriations 
146. Prior to the INA, Congress passed piecemeal immigration legislation starting in
1882. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
147. 8 U.S.C. §1555(d) (2013).
148. The letter from then DOJ Acting Assistant to the Attorney General, Peter
Campbell Brown, included in the Congressional Report on the bill, stated: “In order to 
preclude the raising of points of order against the Department of Justice appropriation bills 
on the ground that certain expenditures provided for therein have not previously been 
authorized by law, it is recommended that legislation be enacted to supply substantive law 
for such recurring items.” S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 2 (1950).  
149. This intent was in line with what at the time was the policy of eliminating
legislative language from appropriation bills. See 96 CONG. REC. 5315, 5326 (1950). The 
bill, entitled “Authorization of Certain Administrative Expenses for Department of Justice,” 
id., had the stated purpose of “enact[ing] into substantive law authorization for certain items 
that frequently recur in the Appropriation Act dealing with administrative expenses incurred 
by the Department of Justice.” S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 1 (1950). 
150. The legislation has nine sections in total, each of which addresses a specific
classification of expenses concerning operations within the DOJ: (1) Costs associated with 
trials, including payment of notarial fees and compensation to witnesses; (2) Expenses 
related to the transfer of drug-addicted prisoners; (3) Permission to purchase new books and 
periodicals by using the proceeds made by selling older ones; (4) Costs associated with 
internal investigations within the DOJ, as well as of officials of U.S. District Courts; (5) 
Expenditures related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s response to “unforeseen 
emergencies”; (6) Costs of certain functions carried out by the Commissioner of Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS); (7) Expenses related to the Bureau of Prison’s continued 
care of mentally ill inmates; (8) Permanent authority to the Attorney General to purchase 
land adjacent to federal penitentiaries; and (9) Correction of a bookkeeping problem so that 
funds related to charging prison personnel for meals, laundry service, etc., are credited to the 
DOJ’s, not Treasury’s, coffers. Id. at 2-3. 
151. Id. at 2.
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now or hereafter provided for the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall 
be available for . . . (d) payment of allowances (at such rate as may be specified 
from time to time in the appropriation act involved) to aliens, while held in 
custody under the immigration laws, for work performed.”152 
Section 6(d) was a late addition to the bill,153 and the DOJ, in a letter to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee chair, Patrick McCarran, explained that it was 
“included at the urgent request of the Commissioner of Immigration and 
Naturalization to meet a practical problem encountered in the work of that 
Service.”154 The DOJ elaborated further during a House Judiciary Committee 
hearing by testifying that the payment of allowances to immigrant detainees for 
work performed would help the INS maintain order in detention facilities, 
specifically that the “problem of maintaining these aliens in detention is greatly 
minimized if they can put an alien to some useful work and pay him a modest 
daily return for the work he does.”155 The type of work contemplated was 
described as “[a]ny kind of work around the detention center or camp, such as 
policing the place, cooking, or, possibly, attending some small garden farm or 
plot.”156 
During the same House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative 
Samuel Francis Hobbs raised the question of whether detainee labor constituted 
a form of punishment. The DOJ witness, George Miller, assured the 
Congressman that it was not: 
 Mr. Hobbs. Is it clear that it is voluntary? It was held in the Michigan case 
decided by the Supreme Court157 that we had no authority to detain them, even 
in a case of deportation, at hard labor. Is this purely voluntary? 
 Mr. Miller. I should say it is voluntary. Certainly there is no intention I 
have ever heard of that these people would be forced to labor.158  
When asked about the practice at the time related to detainees performing 
labor, Miller testified that they work, but do not get paid: 
[Representative Clyde] Reed. How do they do it now, without this law? 
Mr. Miller. They do not pay them. 
152. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 3 (1950) (language from H.R. 4645). 
153. See id. at 4-5, 21 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the Accounts 
Branch, Department of Justice). 
154. S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 2 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2309, at 3 (1950). 
155. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 21 (1950) (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the 
Accounts Branch, Department of Justice). 
156. Id. at 22-30 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the Accounts 
Branch, Department of Justice). 
157. Rep. Hobbs was referring to Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), 
which was decided by the Supreme Court on appeal from the Eastern District of Michigan. 
See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 for a discussion of Wong Wing. 
158. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 31 (1950). 
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 Mr. Reed. They do not pay them anything, and they do work. It must be 
voluntary.  
Mr. Miller. Yes.159 
The DOJ mentioned “eighty cents or a dollar a day” as a suggested rate of 
pay for detainee labor, but deferred to the appropriations process to fix the rate 
of pay.160 Congress set the rate of pay in 1950 at one dollar a day, which today 
would be equivalent to about $9.80.161 
1. Political Context
There were two important events surrounding the enactment of the DOJ 
expenditure bill that help explain why the government sought to authorize the 
payment of voluntary detainee labor. The first involved the DOJ’s priorities in 
the era of McCarthyism. The subject matter of the legislation generally was of 
interest in a period of investigations and prosecutions of suspected communists, 
and the era brought a relative spike in immigration detentions specifically.162 
The second was the ratification of the Geneva Convention’s protections for 
prisoners of war, which directly influenced the DOJ’s decision to add the 
provision authorizing payment for immigrant detainee labor into the 
expenditure bill.163  
The overall purpose of the DOJ expenditure bill was to give the agency 
greater leeway in its operations, by decoupling its expenditure decisions from 
the congressional appropriations process.164 In the context of the McCarthy Era, 
this facially administrative purpose becomes more politically charged. 
Historically, the years immediately following World War I were marked by the 
Palmer Raids, named after then DOJ Attorney General Alexander Mitchell 
Palmer. These raids became the hallmark of the First Red Scare, leading to 
more than 10,000 arrests.165 The 1950 expenditure bill was introduced when the 
DOJ was amid another wave of targeting suspected communists in the United 
States,166 and although the legislative history is not explicit in this regard, the 
159. Id. at 31-32. 
160. In the discussions with me about this provision it was proposed to pay the alien eighty
cents or a dollar a day for his work, but, as I say, whether it is 25 cents or $1.50 a day would 
be determined by the rate to be fixed of this provision in the Appropriation Act.  
Id. at 21 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the Accounts Branch, 
Department of Justice). Miller also suggested that the Appropriations Committee can 
specify the rate of payment “from time to time” so that “this [the amount paid] will not 
get out of hand.” Id. 
161. Urbina, supra note 24. 
162. See infra text accompanying note 170. 
163. See infra text accompanying note 173. 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 148-149. 
165. Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from 
History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 78 (2002). 
166. See generally Irving Louis Horowitz, Culture, Politics, and McCarthyism: A 
Retrospective from the Trenches, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 357 (1996); Mari J. Matsuda, 
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subject of the DOJ bill—flexibility in agency expenditures—would facilitate 
expedient arrests and prosecutions. Therefore, it may not be surprising that the 
sponsor of the bill, Senator Patrick McCarran, was himself avidly 
anticommunist.167 
The zealous efforts of the Palmer Raids specifically targeted noncitizens.168 
Although the legislative history of the 1950 DOJ bill is not explicit on this 
particular issue, the arrests and prosecutions of accused noncitizen communists 
already underway were likely at least partly what the DOJ meant when it 
justified INS’s expenditure authorization to be for “certain confidential 
expenditures for unforeseen emergencies.”169 In fact, Congress passed the DOJ 
legislation amidst a spike in the government’s use of immigration detention: 
“Fears of Communist subversion between 1948 and 1952 saw 2,000 lawfully 
resident foreigners held [in detention] . . . pending expulsion on the basis of 
secret evidence.”170 Putting detainees to work and paying them a nominal fee 
for their labor was, as the DOJ testified, a way to maintain order, which would 
have been of particular concern in an unprecedented period of heightened 
Foreword: McCarthyism, The Internment and the Contradictions of Power, 19 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 9 (1998-1999). 
167. Senator McCarran was also the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair at the time. 
Senator Harry Reid vividly described Senator McCarran as “one of the most anti-
Semitic . . . one of the most anti-black, one of the most prejudiced people who has ever 
served in the Senate.” Richard N. Velotta, Harry Reid: Pat McCarran’s Name Shouldn’t Be 
On Anything, LAS VEGAS SUN (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/aug/25/harry-reid-pat-mccarrans-name-shouldnt-be-
anything. The McCarran Act (also known as the Internal Security Act of 1950) “required all 
members of ‘Communist-front’ organizations to register with the . . . government.” Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of 
COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 
1077–78 (2002). Notably, McCarran co-sponsored the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the McCarran-Walter Act), which imposed strict immigration entry quotas and allowed 
for the deportation of “dangerous” aliens.” See ALICIA J. CAMPI, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., 
THE MCCARRAN-WALTER ACT: A CONTRADICTORY LEGACY ON RACE, QUOTAS, AND
IDEOLOGY (2004) (noting that allowing for the deportation of dangerous aliens is part of the 
reason why President Truman vetoed the bill, although his veto was overridden by Congress 
and the bill became law), available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Brief21%20-%20McCarran-
Walter.pdf. 
168. See Frank W. Dunham, Jr., The Thirty-Second Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture on 
Criminal Law: Where Moussaoui Meets Hamdi, 183 MIL. L. REV. 151, 159 (2005) (noting 
that during the Palmer Raids, over 1000 people were deported to Russia without due 
process); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to Deportation 
Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 317 n.382 (2004) (“The Palmer Raids were a series of 
mass arrests conducted under the direction of U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, 
leading to the deportation of alleged subversives . . . . By the early 1920s, the anti-radicalism 
and xenophobia that triggered the Palmer Raids helped give rise to the racially 
discriminatory national origins immigration quotas of the early 1920s.”). 
169. S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 81-2309, at 3. 
170. WILSHER, supra note 31, at 59. 
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detentions.171 
The other event that specifically influenced the government’s inclusion of 
Section 6(d) into the omnibus DOJ bill was the ratification of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.172 This time, the 
legislative history is explicit, as the DOJ testified during the House Judiciary 
Committee hearing that the provision providing allowances for immigrant 
detainee work was modeled after the Convention: “It [Section 6(d)] is along the 
lines of the prisoner of war provision under the Geneva Convention, whereby 
prisoners of war who come to prison camps may be used for useful purposes 
and paid some small amount. It is patterned after that.”173 The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions generally are regarded as the core of international humanitarian 
law, and the prisoners of war protections are no exception. This is evident in 
the prison camp labor provisions, not only with regard to compensation for 
labor performed but in Article 49, which explicitly states that prisoners of war 
“may in no circumstances be compelled to work.”174 As such, the political 
context that influenced the payment of detainee labor law appeared to be a 
combination of security and humanitarian concerns.175 
B. The Voluntary Work Program 
Section 6(d) of the DOJ expenditure bill today is codified in the INA as 8 
171. This period was short-lived, because soon after the INA was enacted in 1952, 
immigration law adopted a presumption that noncitizens in deportation proceedings would 
be paroled rather than detained. See Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 17) (citing 
WILSHER, supra note 31, at 64). 
172. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 31 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the 
Accounts Branch, Department of Justice). The Geneva Convention was ratified on August 
12, 1949, but the United States did not sign on until 1955. See e.g., Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 62, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention], available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=742
14325D0325FE0C12563CD0051AF9E. 
173. Id. In particular, Article 62 of the Convention provided that: “Prisoners of war 
shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining authorities direct. The rate shall be 
fixed by the said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc 
for a full working day.” Geneva Convention, supra note 172. 
174.   Geneva Convention, supra note 172, art. 49, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=517
042012F4D959CC12563CD0051AE8A. 
175. See generally Chacón, supra note 38. Although beyond the scope of this Article, 
the payment of detainee labor provision also came about during a time of feared labor 
shortages. “In 1951, Congress passed Public Law 78, which gave the Bracero program [for 
Mexican guest workers] a permanent statutory basis for the next 13 years. This extension 
was enacted in response to political pressure from growers . . . [and to] growing fears of 
labor shortages during the Korean War.” KOULISH, supra note 82, at 62-63. 
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U.S.C. § 1555(d).176 The rate of pay for detainee labor remains a matter for 
congressional action, and the last time Congress addressed the issue was in the 
Appropriations Act of 1979, when it kept it at one dollar a day.177  
1. Legal Analyses of Detainee Labor
The legality of immigrant detainee work came under scrutiny after the 
enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which for 
the first time made it unlawful for undocumented immigrants to work.178 This 
analysis came from the former INS, in the form of a legal opinion issued by the 
General Counsel’s Office. The opinion addressed the following question: 
“Does work performed by alien detainees in a detention facility operated by or 
contracted through the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . subject the 
Service to the employer sanctions provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act . . . ?”179 
INS’s answer to this question was, “No.” To arrive at this answer, the 
General Counsel’s Office placed immigrant detainee labor outside the scope of 
IRCA employer sanctions by finding that there was no employee/employer 
relationship between the detainee worker and INS or its contractors. The legal 
opinion proffered the following reasoning: “Inmates may be required to 
participate in an institutional work program, and for that participation receive 
remuneration. Work performed is for the purpose of rehabilitation and 
institutional maintenance, not compensation.”180 
The INS General Counsel’s Office reasoning circumventing IRCA, 
however, conflicts with the statute’s legislative history. The first tension is in 
the opinion’s reasoning that detainees may be required to work. The House 
Judiciary Committee hearing on the provision emphasized the voluntary nature 
of detainee work, explicitly distinguishing the practice from the forced labor 
law that was struck down in Wong Wing.181 The Geneva Convention upon 
which the provision was modeled similarly expressly prohibits involuntary 
labor.182 The other source of conflict between the INS’s legal opinion and the 
statute’s legislative history is in downplaying the remunerative aspect of 
detainee labor. Once again, the Committee hearing record makes clear that 
Section 6(d) was meant to change the status quo, which was not paying 
176. S. REP. NO. 1258, at 2-3 (1950); see also 8 U.S.C. §1555(d). 
177. Urbina, supra note 24; Kunichoff, supra note 136. 
178. See supra note 73. 
179 . INS GEN. COUNSEL, THE APPLICABILITY OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS TO ALIEN
DETAINEES PERFORMING WORK IN INS DETENTION FACILITIES, Op. No. 92-8 (1992). 
180. Id. (emphasis added) (“Therefore, an inmate who participates in a work program 
in a state or federal facility is not doing so ‘for wages or other remuneration’ and is not 
therefore an ‘employee’ as defined by [the corresponding regulation to IRCA].”). 
181. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
182. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
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detainees for work performed.183 Moreover, the fact that the provision was 
lifted from the language of the Geneva Convention demonstrates the 
importance of the compensatory aspect of the legislation.184  
The other standing analysis of the detainee labor statute is from the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which specifically addressed the rate of pay. In this 
case, Guevara v. INS, the plaintiffs were former and current detainees who 
conducted institutional work such as grounds maintenance, cooking, and 
laundry.185 They alleged that the rate of one dollar a day at which they were 
paid violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).186 In rejecting plaintiffs’ 
claim, the Fifth Circuit characterized detainees as outside the group of workers 
Congress intended to protect under the FLSA: “The congressional motive for 
enacting the FLSA . . . was to protect the ‘standard of living’ and ‘general well-
being’ of the worker in American industry. Because they are detainees removed 
from American industry, Plaintiffs are not within the group that Congress 
sought to protect in enacting the FLSA.”187   
The court further held that detainees do not fall under the definition of 
government “employees” by finding that detainees are the same as inmates in 
the criminal justice system, the latter of which courts have held are outside the 
protection of the FLSA.188 As discussed in Part III.B, however, there are 
dispositive differences between detainees and criminal inmates that put into 
question the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Guevara. 
2. DHS Oversight of Detainee Labor
Within the DHS, ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations 
183. See supra text accompanying note 159. 
184. In an article in which ICE defended detainee paid labor, it failed to acknowledge 
that there are both statutory and administrative guidelines underlying the practice, saying in a 
statement that “there is no specific statute, regulation, or executive order authorizing the 
program.” Susan Caroll, $1 a Day for Immigrants Illegal on Outside, Just Fine in Jail, 
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 26, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/1-a-day-for-immigrants-illegal-on-outside-just-1661907.php.  
185. Guevara v. INS, 902 F.2d 394, 395 (5th Cir. 1990). 
186 . Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that 8 U.S.C § 1555(d) makes an impermissible 
distinction based on alienage without a compelling governmental purpose to justify this 
classification. The court, however, found that because the statute is part of the government’s 
overall power to regulate immigration, it is constitutional as “a valid exercise of the 
congressional power to regulate the conduct of aliens.” Id. at 396-97. 
187. Id. at 396 (citations omitted). 
188. Id. (“These prior decisions . . . have recognized imprisoned individuals are not 
covered under the FLSA because they do not fit the statutory definition of employee and 
because the congressional intent of the FLSA was to protect the standard of living and 
general well-being of the worker in American industry.”) The court looked to prison inmate 
cases because it recognized that there were no other cases addressing specifically labor in the 
context of immigration detention. Id. 
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(DRO) oversees immigration detention operations. 189  It is governed by 
detention standards, which were first issued in November of 2000.190 The 
detention standards address detainee labor by its institutional name—the 
“Voluntary Work Program” (VWP).191 According to the standards, the VWP is 
made available to detainees in all three types of detention facilities. 192 
Information provided through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
filed by Professor Stevens shows that the majority of the facilities that engage 
in paid immigrant labor are facilities contracted by ICE to for-profit 
corporations.193 
Categorized as “detainee services,” the VWP is described as giving 
“detainees opportunities to work and earn money while confined.”194 The 
standards specifically provide that while detainees can volunteer for work 
assignments, they cannot be required to work, except to do “personal 
housekeeping.”195 The standards also specify the limited rights afforded to 
detainees under the VWP. As a general rule, detainees are not permitted to 
work in excess of eight hours a day, forty hours a week. 196  There are 
antidiscrimination prohibitions and a grievance process197  and, “while not 
legally required,” basic health and safety protections afforded to detainees who 
work under the VWP.198 Information obtained by Professor Stevens’s FOIA, 
however, suggests that there has been considerable leeway in the enforcement 
of the limited rights laid out by the standards pertaining to the VWP.199  
189. Interior enforcement is distinct from Customs and Border Patrol, which is
responsible for enforcement at ports of entry and within 100 miles of the border. Authority of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents: An Overview, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Feb. 
23, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/authority-us-customs-and-border-
protection-agents-overview. 
190. Sayed, supra note 84, at 1854 n.115.
191. INS, Voluntary Work Program, in DETENTION OPERATION MANUAL 1 (2000),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/work.pdf. 
192. INS, Voluntary Work Program, in 2011 OPERATIONS MANUAL ICE
PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 382 [hereinafter WORK PROGRAM
STANDARDS], available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
standards/2011/voluntary_work_program.pdf. 
193. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA officer at ICE, to Jacqueline
Stevens, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University (Sept. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter Stevens FOIA], available at 
http://www.governmentillegals.org/2011FOIA13921SlaveLabor.pdf. 
194. WORK PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 192. Note that this seems to be in
conflict with the agency’s earlier legal opinion concerning IRCA. See supra text 
accompanying note 180. 
195. Personal housekeeping includes tasks relating to the upkeep of their immediate
living area such as “making their bunk beds daily, stacking loose papers, keeping the floor 
free of debris and dividers free of clutter.” Id. at 383-84. 
196. Id. at 385.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 382.
199. Stevens FOIA, supra note 193.
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C. Problems Associated with the Voluntary Work Program 
“Zamora” was a lawful permanent resident when ICE detained him after a 
shoplifting conviction.200 He was being held at a contracted, privately run 
immigration detention facility while awaiting his immigration court hearing, 
and was happy to have a job assembling arrival packages for new detainees to 
help him pass the time. Zamora considered this job to be better than others 
available to detainees, because it allowed him to be in close proximity to the 
facility’s administrators with whom he was able to develop good relationships. 
Moreover, he reported that the pay of ninety cents a day was better than what 
he was paid in his last assignment of doing laundry. While he was grateful for 
the work, the pay did not go very far, especially in relation to the cost of items 
in the prison’s commissary: the envelope he purchased to mail a letter to the 
law clinic representing him cost him one dollar—ten cents more than his one-
day earnings. Also, about one month before his immigration court hearing, 
Zamora was suddenly pulled from his job based on a vague assertion of 
“security changes” made in the facility. Zamora told his student attorneys that 
the loss of work made him more desperate than ever to be released from 
detention.  
Zamora’s experience highlights both the complexities and problems with 
paid detainee work. The complexities include the fact that many detainees such 
as Zamora welcome the opportunity to work as a way to endure the stress and 
boredom of incarceration. Zamora’s story also demonstrates that performing 
work can position detainees favorably vis-à-vis guards and other personnel in 
the facility. The first problem is clearly the rate of pay, especially in relation to 
the hyperinflated prices in prison and detention commissaries. The other set of 
problems involve potential abuses related to work opportunities and in some 
cases, work requirements. These and other reported issues will be addressed 
below. 
As discussed, the statutory minimum pay for detainee labor is one dollar a 
day, and has been since 1950 when the law was enacted. Zamora does not 
know why he was paid less than the one-dollar wage, but he is not alone: about 
five percent of detainees in the aggregate are not paid for their labor at all, 
which is how a county in Ohio “saved at least $200,000 to $300,000 a year by 
relying on about 40 detainees each month for janitorial work.”201 In such cases, 
detainee workers sometimes are referred to as “volunteers,” as the ACLU of 
Georgia reported regarding the VWP at the Irwin County Detention Center: 
The work program at Irwin is not compensated. The “volunteers,” as the 
detainees are called, have duties that range from cleaning and kitchen duty to 
200. This narrative involves a case that is part of the Washington College of Law 
Immigrant Justice Clinic’s active docket. The facts relayed were obtained during the course 
of representation. “Zamora” is not the detainee’s actual name; the detainee’s name has been 
altered to protect his identity given that the detainee’s case is pending. 
201. Urbina, supra note 24. 
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distributing clothing to new arrivals. Detainee interviews revealed that the 
work of the volunteers is poorly monitored at times, which has resulted in 
reports of abuse and discrimination dealt out to other detainees.202 
Some detainees describe being paid in junk food in lieu of the dollar-a-day 
wage. Karina Tamayo from the Northwest Detention Center received a 
chocolate bar and chips for cleaning other cells and folding blankets for 
incoming detainees.203 Tamayo said that while detainees would receive the 
dollar wage for laundry shifts, other jobs were compensated with snack food.204 
Other detainees who are given the dollar-a-day rate of pay report being paid in 
“credits toward food, toiletries and phone calls.”205 Such items often are 
necessities that are not provided by the facility—for example, detainees in 
Arizona’s Eloy Detention Center are only provided soap and must buy their 
own shampoo.206 Often goods sold by prisons and detention facilities are 
offered at exorbitant prices,207 which is why Professor Stevens posits that 
detainees often participate in the VWP primarily “so that they can buy food and 
hygiene products. If they don’t have relatives on the outside to pump up their 
commissary accounts then they’ll buff floors.”208  
In other reported cases, detainee labor is an alternative to punishment or 
harsher treatment. For Marian Martins, a detainee held in Alabama’s Etowah 
County Detention Center, “work had been her only ticket out of lockdown, 
where she was placed when she arrived without ever being told why.”209 
Martins was compensated for her work, which included cooking and scrubbing 
202. ACLU, supra note 120, at 87.
203. Audio tape: Interview of Karina Tamayo at Northwest Detention Center (Apr.
2013) (on file with author). 
204. Id.
205. Urbina, supra note 24. Detainees with relatives out of state have reported having
to pay higher charges for phone calls. See ACLU, supra note 120, at 52. Moreover, the ICE 
Detention Standards include providing reasonable telephone rates, but jails holding detainees 
are not required to follow these standards. Leticia Miranda, Dialing with Dollars: How 
County Jails Profit from Immigrant Detainees, NATION (May 15, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/179775/dialing-dollars-how-county-jails-profit-immigrant-
detainees# (“About 50 percent of all immigrant detainees are held in county jails, according 
to ICE, and many of these cash-strapped jails, like Plymouth County Detention Center, have 
sought to raise revenue through contracts with phone companies that charge excessive rates 
and kick back part of the profits. Immigrant detainees end up paying the same inflated 
telephone rates charged to their citizen inmate counterparts . . . .”). 
206. Nina Rabin, Unseen Prisoners: Women in Immigration Detention Facilities in
Arizona, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 695, 732 (2009). 
207. See Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prisons, Sky-High Phone
Rates and Money Transfer Fees, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/business/in-prisons-sky-high-phone-rates-and-money-
transfer-fees.html?_r=0; Marisa Lagos, Mirkarimi Looks to Cut Costs Paid by Inmates,
Families, S.F. CHRON. (July 24, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Mirkarimi-
looks-to-cut-costs-paid-by-inmates-5642361.php.
208. Kunichoff, supra note 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Urbina, supra note 24.
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showers, with extra free time.210 Other detainees have reported being punished 
for not participating in the VWP. Similar to Hassall Moses, the detainee from 
Northwest Detention Center who was allegedly put in solitary confinement for 
encouraging a work stoppage,211 a detainee in CCA’s Stewart Detention Center 
in Georgia212  reported that he was placed in segregation for a week for 
declining to work and organizing a work strike.213 
Another Stewart detainee, Eduardo Zuñiga, was injured while working in 
the kitchen as he waited to be deported to Mexico:  
[Zuñiga] tore ligaments in one of his knees after slipping on a newly mopped 
floor, leaving him unable to walk without crutches. Despite doctors’ orders to 
stay off the leg, Mr. Zuñiga said, the guards threatened him with solitary 
confinement if he did not cover his shifts. Now back in Mexico . . . he must 
walk with a leg brace.214 
Yet another Stewart detainee reported that he “was threatened with 
segregation if he refused to work less than eight hours a day,” and alleged that 
this was “not atypical.”215 Such stories have compelled the ACLU to conclude 
that, “[e]ven though the [VWP] is supposed to be voluntary, detainees’ 
experiences are illustrative of its coercive nature.”216 
Another issue reported by detainees is discrimination in the administration 
of the VWP. One specific manner in which discrimination has manifested is in 
who gets work. Detainees held at the Central Arizona Detention Center, for 
example, have reported that there are limited jobs available to them relative to 
prisoners: “Detainees were permitted to work jobs only within the pod, whereas 
federal marshal prisoners could work in positions throughout the facility. Even 
with this restriction, the few jobs that did not require leaving the pod were 
frequently assigned to federal prisoners instead of the detainees.”217 At Eloy 
Detention Center, also in Arizona, “[n]ew detainees, particularly those who are 
not favored by the guards, which often correlated with being non-English 
speaking and less acculturated to the United States, faced the most obstacles in 
210. Id. 
211. See supra Introduction. Other detainees from the Northwest Detention Center who 
protested the rate of pay were allegedly retaliated against by not even getting a dollar a day: 
“Detainees who have complained about doing janitorial work for only a dollar a day are now 
being given a single candy bar or a bag of chips for volunteer work.” Blumenthal, supra note 
2.  
212. Stewart is the largest immigration detention facility in the country. DET. WATCH
NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE: STEWART DETENTION CENTER GEORGIA 1, available at 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/ExposeClose/
Expose-Stewart11-15.pdf.  
213. See ACLU, supra note 120, at 57. 
214. Urbina, supra note 24. 
215. ACLU, supra note 120, at 57. 
216. Id. 
217. Rabin, supra note 206, at 733-34. 
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securing a job.”218 
III. DETAINEE LABOR AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The range of problems associated with the Voluntary Work Program calls 
for an array of solutions, some of which are outlined in the Conclusion. This 
Part will address the core constitutional concern associated with the VWP, 
which turns on whether the work performed by detainees is in fact voluntary. 
Specific detainees’ experiences related to the VWP discussed above that could 
constitute forced detainee labor include being placed in solitary confinement 
and otherwise being punished for not wanting to work, refusing to work more 
than eight hours a day, and calling for a work strike. This Part explores how 
cases of involuntary detainee labor are a violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude. Courts have cited the 
Exception Clause provided within the constitutional provision to uphold forced 
labor in the context of the criminal justice system. As discussed below, this 
exception is not applicable to the civil system of immigration detention in 
which the VWP operates. 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment and Its Exception Clause 
The Thirteenth Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . . Congress shall have 
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”219 Adopted on 
December 6, 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment came on the heels of the 
Emancipation Declaration to place “abolition on a broader and more secure 
constitutional foundation” than what was provided by the Declaration.220 The 
first clause prohibits outright slavery and involuntary servitude, which relate to 
specific acts whose meanings have evolved over time.221 The second clause of 
the Amendment confers upon Congress the power to prohibit conduct or laws 
that subject individuals to degradation similar to that imposed by slavery, i.e. 
“badges of slavery” or “badges of servitude.”222 The Thirteenth Amendment is 
the only constitutional provision currently in effect that can be applied to 
private persons or entities.223  
218. Id. at 733. 
219. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2. 
220. George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2008). 
221. See infra Part III.B.1. 
222. Lauren Kares, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of 
a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 376-77 (1995).  
223. James Gray Pope, What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why 
Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189, 189 (2011) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment stands out 
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Litigation challenging the terms and conditions of prison labor generally 
has been unsuccessful in large part due to the “except as a punishment for 
crime” clause provided by the constitutional provision.224 Some have made the 
argument that the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception clause should be limited 
to prisoners who have been sentenced specifically to work as their 
punishment.225 The plaintiff in Smith v. Dretke, for example, claimed that the 
Texas Department of Corrections violated the Thirteenth Amendment by 
forcing him to perform work in prison despite the fact that his sentence did not 
call for such labor.226 The court, however, found that Smith did not have to be 
sentenced to hard labor in order to be forced to work, and dismissed the suit as 
frivolous.227 
Another argument advanced to challenge prison labor under the Thirteenth 
Amendment is that inmate labor in the context of for-profit prisons for little to 
no pay should constitute prohibited involuntary servitude. 228  Before the 
enactment of the Prison Industries Act in 1995, “prison labor for the private 
sector was legally barred for years, to avoid unfair competition with private 
companies.” 229  Criminal justice expert Ira Robbins, however, has stated, 
as the sole rights guarantee that protects not only against government, but also against 
private concentrations of power . . . .”); Rutherglen, supra note 220, at 1370 (“[A] ‘private 
action’ interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be viewed as a limitation upon its 
scope, since the Amendment applies to both state and private action . . . . With the repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment stands alone among provisions of 
the Constitution in having such expansive coverage.”). 
224. See, e.g., Villareal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 206 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the Thirteenth Amendment limits prisoners’ rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act); 
Northrop v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:08-cv-0746, 2008 WL 5047792 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 
24, 2008) (noting an earlier holding by the District Court that the Thirteenth Amendment 
does not apply to plaintiff’s forced labor claim because he is being “held to answer for a 
violation of a penal statute.”); Wilkinson v. McManus, 216 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 
1974) (holding the exception clause to find that plaintiff’s constitutional claims as to the 
prison labor program generally and the amount of pay specifically have no merit); Kamal 
Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause and Sexual 
Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 609 (2008) (“The punishment clause appears to be aimed at 
an important concern . . . . The Thirteenth Amendment, after all, sought to root out the evils 
of antebellum slavery not the harshness of prison life.”). 
225. See, e.g., Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the 
Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 399-
400 (2009) (“[T]he modem doctrine of prison deference presents a comparably formidable 
obstacle to the adoption of an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ‘punishment for 
crime’ exception that limits it to those inmates who are compelled to work as punishment; 
that is, to the extent they are so sentenced by a judge or jury.”). 
226. 157 F. App’x 747, 747 (5th Cir. 2005). 
227. Id. at 748. 
228. See, e.g., Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners For Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment 
Case Against State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 214 (2009) 
(“By doing such work in the private context, however, prisoners directly contribute to the 
profit-making function of the corporation. At the very least, therefore, inmate labor in private 
prisons constitutes ‘involuntary servitude.’”). 
229. Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor, NATION 
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“[O]nce a prisoner is convicted, it appears that the ‘convict labor exception’ 
applies without regard to the type of facility in which the confinement shall 
take place, whether public or private.”230 In the context of the criminal justice 
system, the Thirteenth Amendment has been generally interpreted to contain “a 
prisoner exception clause.” 231  In addition to the plain language of the 
Amendment, some have posited that this exception is indicative of the notion 
that labor in the penal context is nonmarket work.232 
B. The Thirteenth Amendment in the Context of Immigration Detention 
As outlined above, inmates in the criminal justice system have not 
successfully asserted their Thirteenth Amendment right against forced prison 
labor. This Subpart explores how custodial labor in the context of the 
immigration system warrants a different outcome. The broad argument is that 
the “punishment for crime” exception of the Thirteenth Amendment does not 
apply to immigration detention, because detention is not punishment, and 
immigration violations for which detainees are held are not crimes.233 Building 
on this argument, the following discussion will outline how the overall goals of 
prison labor do not, for the most part, apply to immigration detention. In doing 
so, it will examine the treatment of prison labor in the context of pretrial 
criminal detention, contending that immigration detention is at least analogous 
to the pretrial setting. 
The distinction between the criminal justice and immigration systems, 
namely that the latter is civil, means that there is a normative difference 
between prison and detainee labor. From the vantage of both the offender and 
society, the overarching objectives of prison labor are punitive, rehabilitative, 
and restorative.234 Institutionally, the goals are administrative, i.e. efficiency 
(Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hidden-history-alec-and-prison-
labor. 
230. Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 
531, 606 (1989). 
231.  Vanskike v. Peters, 74 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The Thirteenth Amendment 
excludes convicted criminals from the prohibition of involuntary servitude . . . .”); Jobson v. 
Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[T]hose in control of institutions for the mentally 
retarded may subject inmates to a wide variety of programs with both therapeutic and cost 
saving purposes without violating the Thirteenth Amendment.”); Ghali, supra note 224, at 
609. 
232. See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 144, at 897-903 (discussing the distinction between 
market and nonmarket labor in employment law, and whether the nonmarket nature of prison 
labor is relevant). 
233. See Donald Hancock, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Juvenile Justice System, 
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, 616 (1992) (making an analogous argument in the 
context of the juvenile justice system that “[b]ecause juvenile court findings are distinct from 
criminal convictions, juvenile court dispositions which include involuntary servitude may 
not be exempt under the Thirteenth Amendment”). 
234. Timothy J. Flanagan, Prison Labor and Industry, in THE AMERICAN PRISON:
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and reducing idleness, and financial, i.e. lowering the cost of operating jails and 
prisons.235 Immigration detainee labor may share the institutional goals of 
prison labor,236 especially in the context of the detention system’s current scope 
and size, although one can question as a moral matter whether it should. But 
this is where the overlap ends. Unlike prison labor, detainee labor must be 
voluntary, as early case law, legislative history, and the programmatic name 
associated with the practice—tellingly categorized under “detainee services” in 
ICE’s detention standards—make clear.237 The individual and societal goals of 
prison labor do not fit into the civil context of immigration detention.  
Since most detainees are awaiting their immigration hearings, the 
distinction made by prison labor jurisprudence between pretrial and 
postconviction incarceration is instructive in further fleshing out the difference 
between custodial labor in the criminal justice and immigration detention 
contexts. 238  This distinction begins with the language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s exception clause, namely that involuntary servitude may exist 
“as a punishment for crime” of which a person has been “duly convicted.”239 
Individuals incarcerated pretrial have not been convicted, and as such are 
protected against conditions that constitute punishment. 240  Following this 
distinction, courts have established there is no rehabilitative purpose for pretrial 
detention.241 
In McGarry v. Pallito, the Second Circuit cited the non-rehabilitative 
function of pretrial detention to uphold a prisoner’s Thirteenth Amendment 
claim against forced labor.242 Finbar McGarry was a pretrial detainee at a 
Vermont correctional facility where he was allegedly compelled to “work in the 
prison laundry under the threat of physical restraint and legal process,” namely 
administrative segregation and disciplinary write-ups.243 
The district court dismissed McGarry’s Thirteenth Amendment claim 
based on a finding that being forced to work in the prison laundry was “nothing 
like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the] Amendment.”244 The 
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Thirteenth Amendment “intended to 
prohibit all forms of involuntary labor, not solely to abolish chattel slavery,” 
ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 137 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 
1989); Lisa C. Phelan, Making Prisons Work, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1747, 1749-51 (1997). 
235. Flanagan, supra note 233, at 137. 
236. For example, the legislative history of immigration detainee labor mentions the 
goal of maintaining order in detention facilities. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.  
238. Those who are not awaiting hearings are waiting for ICE to execute their 
deportation, which is also not a conviction. 
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
240. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
241. McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505, 513 (2d Cir. 2012). 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 509. 
244. Id. at 510 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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and that the Amendment does not exempt pretrial detainees.245 
Although immigration detention is a civil system, it has also been 
compared to criminal pretrial detention. 246  Addressing the rights of ICE 
detainees, the Ninth Circuit held that “conditions of confinement for civil 
detainees must be superior not only to convicted prisoners, but also to pre-trial 
criminal detainees.”247 Despite this seemingly uncontroversial legal distinction, 
forced labor in the context of immigration detention as a violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment is not a settled principle. In fact, the Fifth Circuit in 
Channer v. Hall, the only case that has addressed the subject, rejected this 
supposition.248 Claudious Channer claimed that he was subject to involuntary 
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment as an immigration detainee 
compelled to work in the Food Services Department of Oakdale Federal 
Correctional Institution.249 The Court found that, even assuming that he was 
compelled to work through the threat of solitary confinement, Channer’s 
Thirteenth Amendment right was not violated.250 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit 
relied upon a characterization of Channer’s work as the performance of 
“housekeeping tasks,” which the Indiana Supreme Court categorized as labor 
that fit within the “civic duty” exception of the Thirteenth Amendment.251 The 
court went on to hold that “the federal government is entitled to require a 
communal contribution by an INS detainee in the form of housekeeping tasks, 
and that Channer’s kitchen service, for which he was paid, did not violate the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude.”252   
It is significant that the Channer decision predates ICE’s detention 
standards, the latter of which was first issued in 2000.253 These standards make 
clear that detainees cannot be required to work,254 and while they state that the 
performance of “personal housekeeping” is an exception to the voluntary work 
245. Id. In doing so, the Court acknowledged, “it is clearly established that a state may 
not ‘rehabilitate’ pretrial detainees.” Id. at 513. 
246. See, e.g., Clay McCaslin, “My Jailor is My Judge”: Kestutis Zadvydas and the 
Indefinite Imprisonment of Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 224 
(2000). 
247. SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 2 (2007) (citing Jones v. Blanas, 393 
F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820 (2005)), available at 
www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/unsr_briefing_materials.pdf. 
248. Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1997). 
249. Id. at 215. 
250. Id. at 218. The claim therefore satisfied the standard set in a seminal Thirteenth 
Amendment case, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), in which the Supreme 
Court held that for involuntary servitude to exist, there must be physical or legal coercion. 
Id. at 217. 
251. Id. at 218-19. In doing so, the court noted that such tasks have been upheld in the 
context of mental institutions. Id. 
252. Id. at 219. 
253. Sayed, supra note 84, at 1854 n.115. 
254. See WORK PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 192, at 382. 
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rule, the definition provided does not encompass the type of work at issue in 
Channer.255 ICE’s own guidelines regarding the Voluntary Work Program, 
therefore, are in contravention to the Fifth Circuit’s preceding, almost two-
decades-old decision on the subject. The McGarry decision upholding 
Thirteenth Amendment rights in the pretrial criminal detention context should 
further weigh against adherence to the Channer holding. 
1. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Application to Immigrant Detainee Labor
It is relatively noncontroversial that the scope of the Thirteenth 
Amendment extends beyond the physical acts of slavery imposed on African 
Americans. The Amendment’s broad scope was first asserted in its legislative 
history by Senator Lyman Trumbull’s “badges and incidents of slavery” 
discussion.256 Congress thereafter invoked the power conferred by this second 
clause to designate several southern states’ Black Codes as badges of slavery.257 
Modern-day examples include discrimination in the making or enforcement of 
contracts and in the sale or lease of housing. Generally, “[t]he meaning of the 
Thirteenth Amendment has diverged widely at different moments in history—
emphasizing the right to contract during the Lochner era, New Deal labor and 
economic rights in the 1930s and 1940s, and desegregation and 
antidiscrimination during the civil rights era of the 1960s.”258 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, soon after the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, acknowledged its applicability to noncitizens. In The 
Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Miller stated that the constitutional provision 
does not only apply to slavery against African Americans, but also to “Mexican 
peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.”259 In fact, “[t]he language of the 
255. Channer, 112 F.3d at 219; WORK PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 192, at 382. 
256. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); see The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 92 (1872); see also William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth 
Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 82-
86 (2004) (arguing that giving only Congress power to address badges of slavery is 
inconsistent with the Thirteenth Amendment’s legislative history and recent Supreme Court 
precedent); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese 
Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and 
Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 73-74 (1996) (outlining a broad view of Thirteenth 
Amendment’s scope). But see Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 
RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 388 (1967) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment was only 
intended to bring about the emancipation of African Americans); Alexander Tsesis, 
Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337, 1341 (2009) (citing The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 11, 19 (1883), where the Court referred to the Thirteenth 
Amendment as “simply abolish[ing] slavery”). 
257. Kares, supra note 222, at 376-77. 
258. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment in Historical Perspective, 11 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1451, 1452 (2009). 
259. Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of ‘universal civil and political 
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Thirteenth Amendment has never been limited to the concept of citizenship, 
and consequently, this provision has always applied to noncitizens as well as 
citizens.” 260  The Valmonte court, however, has limited the Amendment’s 
applicability to prohibiting the forced service of one to another.261 Today, the 
Thirteenth Amendment has been invoked to protect the rights of immigrant 
workers, including in the context of guest worker programs and domestic 
workers. 262 In this landscape, the Thirteenth Amendment stands out as a 
potentially valuable tool to protect against forced immigrant detainee labor. 
CONCLUSION: CHIPPING AWAY AT PUNITIVE IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
As discussed in the previous Part, involuntary detainee labor should be 
prohibited as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery and 
involuntary servitude. The constitutionality of involuntary labor in immigration 
detention, however, is not the only concern related to the practice. As outlined 
in Part II.B.2, the management of immigration detention is plagued by lack of 
meaningful enforcement and oversight. This is particularly worrisome given 
that ICE contracts out about half of the facilities in the vast detention system to 
for-profit prison companies. Early in its first term the Obama administration 
acknowledged the need to improve agency oversight over immigration 
detention.263 It even announced an intention to build a “truly civil” system, 
recognizing that detention has veered considerably into the realm of the 
freedom’ applies to citizens from any race or class who have been branded with a badge of 
inferiority or involuntary servitude.”); Torok, supra note 256, at 72 (“The [Thirteenth] 
Amendment relates to Chinese immigrants because ‘coolieism’ was often viewed as a 
species of slavery.”); Tsesis, supra note 256, at 1340 (citing The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872)). 
260. Torok, supra note 256, at 72. 
261. Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying a Thirteenth 
Amendment cause of action to non-citizen nationals of U.S. territories).  
262. Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day Involuntary 
Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking, 38 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 941 (2007); Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the 
Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923 
(2007); Maria L. Ontiveros & Joshua R. Drexler, The Thirteenth Amendment and Access to 
Education for Children of Undocumented Workers: A New Look at Plyler v. Doe, 42 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 1045 (2008) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should apply to migrant 
workers’ children); Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Abusive Mail-Order Bride Marriage and the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2000). See generally Alexander Tsesis, Into 
the Light of Day: Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2012) (citing Professor Richard Delgado’s call for a more 
active application of non-Thirteenth Amendment remedies for non-African Americans, such 
as Native Americans and Latinos). 
263. Spencer S. Hsu, ICE to Strengthen Oversight of Immigrant Detention, WASH.
POST (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/06/AR2009080601543.html. 
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punitive, but it has failed to make much progress on fulfilling this promise.264 
The creation of a system of accountability for immigration detention would 
help ensure that the Voluntary Work Program is not misused to the detriment of 
detainees. 
Another considerable concern related to detainee labor is the rate of pay. 
Some have argued that the Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage 
protection should be extended to detainee labor.265 Professor Stevens contends 
that the FLSA should apply to the modern immigration detention system 
regardless of historical context: 
The history suggests that whatever Congress in 1950 may have intended for 
the wages paid to aliens held under immigration laws, it has little bearing on 
the program in place today. The worker/employer relation in today’s ICE 
facilities is much closer to the factors contemplated in the FLSA than it is to 
the economics and management of the multi-faceted alien internment, prisoner 
of war, and immigrant detention laws and policies in the 1940s.266 
Even assuming arguendo that detainee labor is not covered by the FLSA, 
the paltry sanctioned rate of one dollar a day—a rate that has not changed since 
1950—is ripe for revision. The statute requires that the rate of pay be reviewed 
“from time to time” through Congress’s appropriations process,267 but the last 
time this occurred was in 1979. In addition to a potential violation of the letter 
of the law, there is a moral concern: the rate of pay under the Voluntary Work 
Program, which in the words of Hassall Moses is akin to “modern-day 
slavery,”268 is now a cornerstone for the profits made by companies running the 
facilities. Put another way, “[t]he financial necessity for privately run ICE 
detention facilities to have available detainee labor has reportedly created 
perverse incentives to coerce detainees into the VWP.”269 
In arguing for a critical examination of “voluntary” immigrant detainee 
labor, this Article joins those calling for legal and policy reforms to the 
immigration enforcement system “with the goals of scaling back or altering the 
nature of detention to conform to its status as a civil, rather than penal, 
264. Susan Carroll, ICE Paints Bleak Picture of Detention System, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 
10, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/ICE-paints-bleak-picture-of-its-
detention-system-2209428.php. 
265. See Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immigration 
Jail Work Programs—A History and Legal Analysis, 1943-Present 14-15 (May 15, 2014) 
(working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2434006.  
266. Id. at 95. Professor Stevens filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against 
ICE regarding the Voluntary Work Program contending, inter alia, that ICE is in violation of 
Department of Treasury rules and the separation of powers based on Congress’s failure to 
address the rate of pay issue through its appropriations process. Complaint at 4, Stevens v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:14-cv-03305 (N.D.Ill. May 6, 2014). 
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d) (2013). 
268. Moses, supra note 6. 
269. Complaint, supra note 266, at 5. 
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institution.”270 Detainee labor, and the significant problems and moral questions 
associated with it, is another attribute of a “crimmigration” system that has 
gone too far. At the heart of the matter is a bloated detention system, unmoored 
from its original rationale, which is operating without meaningful checks and 
balances within a broken immigration system.271 Reforming the Voluntary 
Work Program would constitute one way to scale back what has become an 
unjustifiably punitive institution. 
270. Das, supra note 16, at 138. 
271. “[T]he civil nature of immigration enforcement suggests, rather than merely 
different conditions of detention, that the overall system should employ detention less.” 
Mark Noferi, New ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards: Does “Civil” Mean Better 
Detention or Less Detention?, CRIMMIGRATION (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://crimmigration.com/2012/08/28/new-aba-civil-immigration-detention-standards-does-
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